This appeal arose in relation to a claim for a cargo of cigars and cigar bands which were lost while being transported from Puerto Rico to Florida, United States. The transportation consisted of two legs: the first was sea carriage from Puerto Rico to the port of Jacksonville, Florida, and the second was road carriage to Tampa, Florida. A single though bill of lading was issued in Puerto Rico. The appellant buyer, Altadis USA Inc, claimed against the first respondent contractual carrier, Sea Star Line LLC. The first respondent sub-contracted the road leg to American Trans-Freight (ATF) Inc, the second respondent. At some point after receiving the container, the second respondent's driver parked the truck loaded with the container in the front driveway of a closed gas station, and left the vehicle overnight. When he returned the next day to continue the trip to Tampa, the container was gone. It was later found empty in South Dade County, Florida.

Prior to the carriage of the cargo, the appellant and the first respondent had entered into a Transportation Service Agreement (TSA), which required the first respondent to pay the appellant damages for lost containers. The 'General Rules' of the TSA also stated that the first respondent would issue a transportation bill of lading and export declaration for each shipment, and that the 'terms and conditions printed upon the Bill of Lading shall govern all such shipments'.

The TSA also stated that the bill of lading would govern the relationship between the first respondent and the appellant, and would be subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). It also included 'inland carriers' as part of the definition of 'Carrier' in the agreement, and extended the benefits of the TSA to 'all parties performing services for or on behalf of Carrier or the Vessel as employees, servants, agents or contractors, including without limitation ... inland carriers'.

The first and second respondents had also signed a Uniform Intermodal Interchange and Facilities Access Agreement (UIIA). It stated that the first respondent would, from time to time, hire the second respondent to transport, to various locations, containers that the first respondent had transported to Jacksonville by ocean carriage under an intermodal through bill of lading. It also stated that the second respondent would indemnify and hold harmless the first respondent in the event of damage or loss caused by the second respondent. The District Court ruled in favour of the first and second respondents that the appellant's claim was time-barred by the COGSA statute of limitations.

Held: The District Court’s decision is affirmed.

The appellant argued that the Carmack Amendment 49 USC s 14706(e) governed the case, and thus the Carmack Amendment's two-year time bar, rather than the one-year time bar provided in COGSA and the bill of lading, should apply. The loss had occurred on 25 March 2003, and the appellant served notice on the defendants on 13 April 2004.

COGSA s 1303(6) provides that the carrier 'shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year'. The bill of lading contained a similar provision.

The Carmack Amendment and its two-year minimum statute of limitations does not apply to a shipment from a foreign country governed by a through bill of lading unless a domestic segment of the shipment is covered by a separate domestic bill of lading: American Road Service Co v Consolidated Rail 348 F 3d 565 (6th Cir 2003); Shao v Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd 986 F 2d 700, 703 (4th Cir 1993); Capitol Converting Equipment v LEP Transport 965 F 2d 391, 394 (7th Cir 1992); Swift Textiles Inc v Watkins Moto Lines Inc 799 F 2d 697 (11th Cir 1986).

The appellant tried to distinguish the above cases by arguing that the inland, domestic leg of the trip was subject to the Carmack Amendment. It argued that a domestic bill of lading, not a separate bill of lading, was required for the Carmack Amendment to apply. It also argued that all the other cases involved foreign shipments, whereas its case concerned ocean shipment within the United States. The Court did not agree.

The appellant’s position is in tension with the maritime nature of the contract: Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Kirby 543 US 14 (2004) (CMI1454). It would introduce uncertainty and lack of uniformity into the process of contracting for carriage by sea, upsetting contractual expectations expressed in through bills of lading. Given the Supreme Court holding in Norfolk, which recognises that a rail carrier on the inland leg of a maritime contract is protected by the limitations in a through bill of lading, the appellant's position would introduce a different result if the inland carrier were a motor carrier. The purpose of COGSA to 'facilitate efficient contracting in contracts for carriage by sea' would be undermined. In the absence of a separate domestic bill of lading covering the inland leg, the Carmack Amendment and its two-year minimum statute of limitations does not apply to this maritime contract. Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the one-year statute of limitations provided for in the bill of lading and in COGSA was applicable.