The plaintiff, Max Reward Co Ltd, sought the following relief:

(i) Declare that the plaintiffs are the owners of the defendant vessel.
(ii) Direct that the defendant vessel be handed over to the plaintiffs or their nominee.
(iii) Direct that the defendant vessel be arrested and not be allowed to sail or its demolition not be commenced unless security for the full market value amounting to US$ 3.2 million is furnished to the satisfaction of the Nazir of this Hon'ble Court.
(iv) Grant any other or better relief that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the case.

The plaintiff invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court under the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Courts Ordinance 1980 (the Ordinance) and stated that its ownership claim fell under s 3(2)(a) and ss 4(1)-(4).

The defendants raised a preliminary objection about jurisdiction. The defendants contended that the High Court does not have jurisdiction since the MV Wenjiang is not a 'ship' as defined in s 2(k) of the Ordinance, which states: '"Ship" includes any description of vessel used in navigation'. The definition of ship in the General Clauses Act 1897 was also referred to: '"Ship" shall include every description of vessel used in navigation not exclusively propelled by oars'. The defendants argued that since the MV Wenjiang was not navigable, it did not come within the statutory definition of a 'ship'. As such, the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction; and further, the plaintiff's claim did not fall within the definition of a maritime lien.

The MV Wenjiang, an oil tanker, was stranded in 1980 in the waters known as Shatt-al-Arab that lie between Iran and Iraq, as a consequence of the hostilities that broke out between the two countries. Subsequently, the vessel was removed from Shatt-al-Arab into Iranian waters by the Iranian authorities. The vessel was owned by Hemisphere Shipping Co Ltd and was allegedly sold to Paul Cheng & Sons Investment Ltd in 1988. The latter company and Ghaffar & Co entered into a Memorandum of Agreement in 2007 for the sale of the vessel, but the sale did not go through. Paul Cheng & Sons Investment Ltd then allegedly sold the vessel to the plaintiff. Counsel for the plaintiff alleged that Ghaffar & Co and Al-Khair, in collusion with the Iranian authorities, took the vessel out of Iranian waters and brought it to the ship-breaking yard situated at Gaddani, on the coast of Balochistan, Pakistan, and deprived the plaintiff of it.

Held: Judgment for the defendants; suit dismissed for lack of admiralty jurisdiction with costs.

The MV Wenjiang was built in 1960. It was abandoned in 1980 and was mostly unattended for over 30 years. It had to be patched up to float it. Its engine, generators, propeller and anchor were not working. It could only be towed, and could not navigate itself. It had no registration and no crew. It was towed from Iran to Pakistan, and beached at the Gaddani ship-breaking yard, to strip it for scrap, which was its only value.

The first question to be determined is whether the MV Wenjiang was still a 'ship' when the suit was filed. The question as to when a 'ship' ceases to be a 'ship' is a question to be determined by the facts of each case. Some permanence must also attach to the transition, ie from the ship being navigable until it can no longer be navigated, because a ship's engine, generator, propeller, etc, may be damaged or stop working. If the owner/operator is occupied in repairing it to make it seagoing again, it would not be correct to state that it stopped being a 'ship'. However, in this case there is no evidence indicating the revivification of the MV Wenjiang; and we are not to delve into the realm of possibilities to speculate whether it can be made navigable by expending time, money and effort. The MV Wenjiang has remained non-navigable for a considerable period of time, and no effort has been made to make it navigable. The MV Wenjiang does not meet the criteria of what constitutes a 'ship' as specified by the case law and academic literature, and it does not come within the statutory definition of 'ship', since it can no longer be 'used in navigation'.

The fact that the MV Wenjiang is not a 'ship' does not mean that a suit under the admiralty jurisdiction in terms of the Ordinance is not competent, because if the plaintiff has a maritime lien over the MV Wenjiang the suit would still be competent. In Khan v MV Ashar, PLD 1985 (Quetta 278, 287H) Ajmal Mian CJ identified the following as maritime liens: (a) bottomry and respondentia bonds; (b) salvage of property; (c) seafarer's wages; and (d) damage. Since none of the four categories is attracted, there is no right of maritime lien against the MV Wenjiang.