The appellant vessel left the port of Marmagao, India, without issuing bills of lading or other documents required by the respondent for the goods carried by it. On reaching the port of destination, the appellant carrier misdelivered the goods to the consignee, contrary to the respondent's instructions. The respondent instituted an action in rem, invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The vessel was arrested when it entered the port of Vishakapatnam, and was later released on the furnishing of a bank guarantee.
The appellant protested the Court's jurisdiction. This objection was overruled by a Single Judge of the High Court and later confirmed by a Division Bench, against which the present appeal was brought.
The appellant argued that the power of the High Court on the admiralty side is confined to the provisions of the Admiralty Court Act 1861 (UK), made applicable to India by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (Imp), read with the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act 1891, declaring certain Courts of unlimited civil jurisdiction as Colonial Courts of Admiralty, but that this jurisdiction remained frozen as on the date of Admiralty Court Act 1861 (UK), and thus does not extend to foreign ships or outbound carriage of goods by sea.
Held: The appeal is dismissed and the transferred case is returned to the High Court. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction over claims relating to inward and outward cargo movements. Therefore the High Court rightly assumed jurisdiction by the arrest of the appellant vessel while it was lying in the port of Vishakhapatnam.
It is true that Indian statutes lag behind the development of international law in comparison to contemporaneous statutes in England and other maritime countries. Although the Hague Rules are embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925, India never became a party to the International Convention laying down those Rules. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925 merely followed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 (UK). The United Kingdom repealed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 with a view to incorporating the Visby Rules adopted by the Brussels Protocol of 1968. The Hague-Visby Rules were accordingly adopted by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (UK). Indian legislation has not, however, progressed, notwithstanding the Brussels Protocol of 1968 adopting the Visby Rules or the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978 adopting the Hamburg Rules. The Hamburg Rules prescribe the minimum liabilities of the carrier far more justly and equitably than the Hague Rules so as to correct the tilt in the latter in favour of the carriers. The Hamburg Rules are acclaimed to be a great improvement on the Hague Rules and are far more beneficial from the point of view of the cargo owners. India has also not adopted the International Convention relating to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships 1952. Nor has India adopted the Brussels Conventions of 1952 on civil and penal jurisdiction in matters of collision; nor the Brussels Conventions of 1926 and 1967 relating to maritime liens and mortgages. India seems to be lagging behind many other countries in ratifying and adopting the beneficial provisions of various Conventions intended to facilitate international trade. Although these Conventions have not been adopted by legislation, the principles incorporated in the Conventions are themselves derived from the common law of nations as embodying the felt necessities of international trade and are as such part of the common law of India and applicable for the enforcement of maritime claims against foreign ships.
All persons and things within the waters of a State fall within its jurisdiction unless specifically curtailed or regulated by rules of international law. The power to arrest a foreign vessel, while in the waters of a coastal State in respect of a respect of a maritime claim wherever arising is a demonstrable manifestation and an essential attribute of territorial sovereignty. This power is recognised by several international Conventions. These Conventions contain the unified rules of law drawn from different legal systems. Although many of these Conventions have yet to be ratified by India, they embody principles of law recognised by the generality of maritime States, and can therefore be regarded as part of our common law. The want of ratification of these Conventions is apparently not because of any policy disagreement, as is clear from active and fruitful Indian participation in the formulation of rules adopted by the Conventions, but perhaps because of other circumstances, such as lack of an adequate and specialised machinery for implementation of the various international Conventions by co-ordinating for the purpose the concerned Departments of the Government. Such a specialised body of legal and technical experts can facilitate adoption of internationally unified rules by national legislation.
The British statute assimilating Indian High Courts to the position of the English High Court in respect of admiralty jurisdiction is an enabling legislation and it is but one of the strands of jurisdiction vested in the High Court by virtue of the constitutional provisions. The jurisdiction of the High Court is governed by the Constitution and the laws, and the continuance in force of the existing laws is not a fetter but an additional source of power. Access to the courts for redress of grievance being an important right of every person, it is essential that the jurisdiction of the courts is construed harmoniously and consistently with its vital function in that respect, so that absence of legislation will not jeopardise that right.
Once a foreign ship is arrested in Indian waters by an order of the High Court, in exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in it by statute, or inherent in it as a court of record, in respect of any maritime claim against its owner, wherever the cause of action may have arisen, and whether or not the ship is subsequently released by the owner furnishing security, the proceeding must continue against the owner as in any other suit. The arrest of the vessel while in Indian waters by an order of the concerned High Court, as defined under the Merchant Shipping Act 1958, attracts the jurisdiction of the competent court to proceed with the trial, as in the case of any other suit, as an action against the owner, and any decree obtained by the plaintiff is executable against any property of the owner available within jurisdiction, including the security furnished by it for the release of the vessel.