On 19 November 2002, the tanker Prestige broke up and sank, producing a large heavy oil spill along the coasts of Spain and France. The Tribunal Supremo/Supreme Court (SC) convicted the master and declared him civilly liable, jointly with Mare Shipping Inc (the shipowner), the London Steamship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (the P&I Club), and the IOPC Fund, and according to the applicable limits (CMI1141). Civil liability was assessed according to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (CLC 1992), and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (Fund Convention 1992), both instruments adopted by Spain. The Audiencia Provincial de Coruña/Coruña Court of Appeal (CA), decided the quantification of compensation, dismissing most of the objections of the defendants and ordering them to pay compensation, including environmental and moral damages (CMI1142). The claimants, including the Spanish and French States, the affected municipalities, local governments, fisheries, and many individuals, as well as the defendants, recurred the decision in cassation before the SC. The IOPC Fund alleged infractions of arts 2, 3, 4, 11.2 and 18 of the Fund Convention 1992, and arts 1.6 and 5 of the CLC 1992. The shipowner and master alleged infractions of arts 1.6, 3.3, and 5.4 of the CLC 1992 and 4.5 of the Fund Convention 1992. The insurer alleged infractions of arts 1.6 and 3.3 of the CLC 1992.

Held: The SC modified the CA's decision.

The IOPC Fund alleged that the compensation fixed for environmental and moral damage must be excluded according to arts 1.6 and 5 of the CLC 1992. The SC agreed, stating that according to art 4.5 of the 1992 IOPC Fund, the liability of the Fund is strict regardless of the fault of any legal agent as it is directly established in this rule. It is also fixed because the same norm establishes the qualitative limits and the damages covered. Article 1.6 of the CLC 1992 defines the pollution damage covered and art 5 establishes the economic limits. Article 1.2 of the Fund Convention 1992 adopts the same definition of 'pollution damage'. From both rules it is apparent that the extent of compensation includes objective and reasonable costs of cleaning-up operations, damage to property, salvage operations, operations of replacing the property destroyed as a result of the polluting event, and reasonable measures for regeneration, recovery, and repair of the environment. It also covers pure economic losses of the persons affected by the oil spill in terms of their commercial activity, when this loss has a causal connection with the accident. Hence, the Fund does not cover moral or emotional damage, but purely material damage. The IOPC Fund also objected that the Fund itself was made responsible for the distribution of the compensation. The rule contained in art 9 of the CLC 1992, which provides that the competent State bodies shall be the only bodies with competence to settle all issues relating to the pro-rata application and distribution of the fund, does not apply to the Fund. Article 18.7 of the Fund Convention 1992 states that the Assembly is the competent body to make decisions regarding the distribution among the claimants of the amount available for compensation under art 4.5. The SC dismissed the objection, as the Spanish Constitution empowers judges to judge and enforce judgments, and art 9 of the CLC 1992 and art 7 of the Fund Convention 1992 are clear in recognising the power of the national bodies entrusted with the enforcement of the consequences of an event submitted to the jurisdiction of its tribunals.

The master and the shipowner also challenged the payment for moral or environmental damage, alleging it fell outside the type of damages stated in art 1.6 of the CLC 1992 covered by the Convention. The SC rejected the argument as the limitation of damage, as analysed for the IOPC Fund's recourse, did not apply to these defendants. Their liability was declared unlimited due to the aggravated negligence of the master in the commission of the crime. Regarding the infraction of art 3.3 of the CLC 1992, the cassation appeal insisted on a declaration of the Spanish State's responsibility for its negligence in handling the crisis and a consequential reduction of the amount of the compensation. The SC reiterated that the proven facts of the decision must be respected and that it did not establish criminal liability on the part of any public officer of the Spanish State. This meant that it was not viable to declare civil liability on the part of the State or to reduce the liability of these defendants. At the stage of enforcement, it was not possible to consider allegations that have not been proven, and that could not generate civil liability. These defendants also alleged an infraction of art 4 of the Fund Convention 1992 as the decision did not respect the proportional distribution of the fund. The SC also rejected this argument because the challenges and how the compensation is distributed do not affect them. As the grounds alleged by the P&I Club were similar, its recourse was also dismissed for the same reasons.