This was an appeal regarding a cargo claim. The issue was whether the claim was out of time.

Held: The decision 269/2006 of the Piraeus Court of Appeal is annulled. The case is referred back for further proceedings to the same Court composed of other judges.

Law 2107/1992 ratified the Hague Rules and the amending Protocols of 1968 and 1979 (the Hague-Visby Rules with SDR Protocol), the provisions of which came into force in Greece on 23 June 1993 and are applicable, among other things, to maritime transport between ports (loading and discharge) in different countries, provided that such transport is covered by a bill of lading or other similar document, which is a title for their execution. In particular, art 3.6 of the above Convention, as amended by art 1 of the Visby Protocol, stipulates that the carrier and the ship will in any case be released from any liability in respect of the goods, if no action has been brought within one year of their delivery or of the date on which they should have been delivered. The above provision establishes an annual limitation period of the recipient's right to compensation for lost or damaged cargo. This limitation period starts from the receipt or delivery of the goods or from the date on which they should have been delivered, and applies to both the contractual and non-contractual liability of the carrier, not only for the loss or damage of goods, but also for the other claims of the interested party regarding the cargo against the carrier.

This limitation period is interrupted, in accordance with the provisions of arts 261 and 270 of the Civil Code, upon the commencement of the action and starts again from the last procedural act of the parties or the Court. Furthermore, according to art 225(1) of the Civil Code, the limitation period is suspended for as long as the beneficiary was prevented by a Court or other reason of force majeure from exercising its claim within the last six months of the limitation period. Force majeure means any unforeseen event in this case, which could not be prevented even by measures of extreme diligence and prudence. A common feature of the grounds for suspension of the limitation period is the objective inability of the creditor to seek satisfaction of its claim.

But such a vitiation does not exist in principle where, after the postponement of the discussion of the lawsuit in the Court to a later trial, and until the next procedural act, which is the discussion of the lawsuit in the postponed trial, the time limitation provided by law is completed, provided that the creditor in view of this risk, especially in the case of a short-term limitation period, may seek to bring the action by appeal to Court before the expiry of the limitation period in order to bring about its termination.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant's claim for loss of its goods which sank, due to a fire that broke out on the vessel due to the fault of the crew, resulting in damage of GRD 110,275,400 from the subsequent sinking of the ship, fell within the limitation period in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules, and rejected as unfounded the allegation of the appellant that the limitation period was suspended according to art 255 of the Civil Code, since the appellant was prevented by force majeure from exercising its claim within the last six months of the limitation period by the late addition of the first defendant to the claim brought by the appellant. The Court of Appeal correctly interpreted and applied: a) art 3.6 of the above Convention, accepting that this provision establishes a one-year limitation period for the consignee's right to compensation for lost or damaged cargo; and b) art 261 of the Civil Code for the interruption of the limitation period with the bringing of an action, with the limitation period starting again from the last procedural act of the parties or the Court. However, in order for the provision of art 255(1) of the Civil Code on the suspension of the limitation period for as long as the beneficiary was prevented by force majeure from exercising its claim within the last six months of the limitation period, the Court of Appeal accepted that the limitation period is suspended for as long as during the last six months of the year the debtor prevented the creditor from exercising the claim by deceit (with fraudulent conduct which is a special form of abuse of right). The Court considered that this did not appear to be a case of force majeure. The fact that the action against the first defendant was brought beyond the limitation period of the disputed claim, was not dependent on the conduct of the party, but related to other factors relating to the organisation and functioning of the Court. With this judgment, the Court of Appeal violated art 255(1) of the Civil Code, because it gave inadequate reasons in its decision on the essential issue of force majeure.