This case concerned the constitutionality of establishing the Oil Pollution Management Fund (OPMF) under s 22(a) of Republic Act No (RA) 9483 and s 1, r of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), by imposing 'ten centavos (10c) per liter for every delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and tanker haulers'.

After repeated oil spills in the Philippines, and noting the lack of a proper response strategy, the absence of the necessary equipment for containing, cleaning up, and removing spilled oil, and the difficulty in pinning liability on oil companies, Congress passed a law implementing the CLC 1969 and the Fund Convention 1992. The CLC 1969 was later amended by the 1992 Protocol (the CLC 1992). On 2 June 2007, RA 9483, entitled 'An Act Providing For The Implementation of the Provisions of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for Other Purposes', or simply the Oil Pollution Compensation Act 2007, was signed into law.

The respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief (with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction), contesting the establishment of the OPMF. The petition was heard by the regional trial Court, Branch 216, Quezon City (RTC). The respondents argued that the obligation to contribute to the OPMF solely imposed upon the owners and operators of oil/petroleum tankers and barges violated their right to equal protection of the law; that the 10 c impost was confiscatory and, thus, violated their right to due process; that s 22(a) was a prohibited rider; and, finally, that the provision provided an undue delegation of legislative power. The RTC granted the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoined the implementation of the provision.

The petitioners now seek review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the RTC erred in declaring s 22(a) of RA 9483 and its implementing rule unconstitutional, given that the respondents' petition for declaratory relief questioned the wisdom behind them and was, thus, beyond the RTC's jurisdiction. The petitioners further argue that the provision is reasonable and just, and does not violate the equal protection clause. The petitioners maintain that public interest in protecting the marine wealth of the country warrants the imposition of the 10 c impost. Finally, the petitioners insist that the creation of the OPMF is relevant to the subject matter of RA 9483.

Held: The petition is granted. The decision of the RTC is reversed and set aside. The constitutionality and validity of s 22(a) of Republic Act No 9483, as well as s 1, r of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, are upheld.

The issue presented is a justiciable question which allows the exercise by this Court of its judicial power, and does not involve a political question. While it may appear that contesting the creation of the OPMF amounts to questioning the wisdom behind the measure, that is not the case. The Court may take judicial action on this question since it is not contesting the creation of the OPMF per se, but rather its inclusion in RA 9483, and the specific parameters incorporated by the legislature in the implementation of the contested provision. More importantly, violations of the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 1987 Constitution alleged by the respondents are well-recognised grounds for a judicial inquiry into a legislative measure. However, a petition for declaratory relief is not the proper vehicle to invoke judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional. The respondents should have invoked the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under art 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

The respondents argue that since RA 9483 was passed to implement the CLC 1992 and the Fund Convention 1992, the creation of the OPMF must be found in these Conventions for it to be validly included in RA 9483. Otherwise, according to the respondents, its inclusion in the law is constitutionally infirm for being a proscribed rider. Concisely, the respective subject matters of the two Conventions are as follows: The CLC 1992 governs the liability of shipowners for oil pollution damage. The Convention lays down the principle of strict liability for shipowners and creates a system of compulsory liability insurance. The shipowner is normally entitled to limit its liability to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of its ship. The Fund Convention 1992, which is supplementary to the CLC 1992, establishes a regime for compensating victims when the compensation under the applicable CLC is inadequate. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, generally referred to as the 1992 Fund, was set up under the Fund Convention 1992. The 1992 Fund is a worldwide intergovernmental organisation, established for the purpose of administering the regime of compensation created by the 1992 Fund Convention. By becoming Party to the Fund Convention 1992, a State becomes a Member of the 1992 Fund. The Fund headquarters is based in London.

As argued by the respondents, the thrust of the CLC 1992 and the Fund Convention 1992 is to impose upon covered ship­owners strict liability for pollution damage arising from oil spills and to provide compensation for victims. On the other hand, the OPMF governs the immediate containment, removal, and clean­-up operations in oil pollution cases and provides for the conduct of research, enforcement, and monitoring activities of relevant agencies. On this basis, it would appear that the Conventions and the OPMF cover two different subject matters - that is, providing compensation versus pollution containment and clean-up - as asserted by the respondents. However, this simplistic, if not myopic, view is not the proper measure to determine whether a provision of law should be declared as unconstitutional. All that can reasonably be required is that the title shall not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection.

A review of the Conventions reveals that they not only cover damage claims by affected individuals, but also all amounts encompassed by the term 'pollution damage' which is defined as:

(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken;

(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.

In its 2011 Annual Report, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF) enumerated the types of claims that are admissible:

An oil pollution incident can generally give rise to claims for five types of pollution damage:

• Property damage
• Costs of clean-up operations at sea and on shore
• Economic losses by fisher folk or those engaged in mariculture
• Economic losses in the tourism sector
• Costs for reinstatement of the environment.

The Conventions, therefore, also cover damage to property, containment, clean-up, and rehabilitation. Thus, the policy underpinning the establishment of the OPMF in s 22(a) of RA 9483 and its IRR is wholly consistent with the objectives of the Conventions. Indeed, by employing preventive and/or immediate containment measures or response techniques, the State is affording protection to persons or all stakeholders who stand to suffer from oil pollution incidents - the main thrust of the Conventions that is now effectively translated and implemented in s 22(a) of RA 9483 and its IRR. In other words, by creating the OPMF, Congress sought to ensure that enforcement agencies are capable of protecting marine wealth and preventing harm from being caused to the people and their livelihood by reason of these unfortunate events.

Time is of the essence when it comes to oil spill response. Oil spill response and containment is directly connected to compensation for damages brought about by the incident. In fact, the two concepts are inversely proportional to each other, in that a more effective and efficient oil spill response and clean up results in lesser pollution damage; and, ultimately, smaller pollution damage means reduced financial liability on the part of the shipowner. Section 22 is thus not a rider, but is an essential provision to attain the purpose of RA 9483.

The RTC's finding that the assailed provisions violate the equal protection guarantee when it singled out 'owners and operators of oil or petroleum tankers and barges' can also not be sustained. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution means that 'no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances'. However, this clause does not preclude classification, as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

Separating 'tankers and barges hauling oil and for petroleum products in Philippine waterways and coast wise shipping routes' from other sea-borne vessels does not violate the equal protection clause. The purpose of the subject legislation is the implementation of the CLC 1992 and the Fund Convention 1992. Both Conventions only cover 'any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo'. This alone already forecloses any argument against the validity of the classification, since the implementation by RA 9483 of the Conventions necessarily carries with it the adoption of the coverage and limitations employed in these texts. The Court cannot subscribe to the respondents' proposition that since all vessels plying Philippine waters are susceptible to accidents which may cause oil spills, all should be made to contribute to the OPMF. While all vessels, channels, and storage facilities that carry or store oil are capable of causing oil pollution, this does not make them 'similarly situated' within the context of the equal protection clause. Aside from the difference in the purposes behind their existence and navigation, it is internationally well-recognised that oil tankers pose a greater risk to the environment and to people. These types of vessels have long been considered as a separate class and have been given a different treatment by various organisations.

The OPMF does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. The creation of the OPMF is not a burdensome cross that the respondents have to bear. Rather, it is an opportunity for them to have an important role in the protection of the environment which they navigate and directly utilise in the conduct of their business. It is proper and timely to remind the respondents that the conduct of a business is a mere privilege which is subject to the regulatory authority of the State. Property rights may be interfered with, especially if it is for the furtherance of the common good. A few business adjustments and sacrifices, weighed against the prevention of the possibly irreparable destruction of the country's natural resources, must necessarily take a back seat. We have the duty to protect our environment for the future generations, and all must share in this responsibility, including legal entities.