Compagnie Française du Thon Oceanique (CFTO) entrusted Le Roux (a commission agent) with the task of organising the shipping of six containers of frozen tuna from Senegal to Türkiye, the goods being destined for the Turkish company Kerevitas. The goods were entrusted by Le Roux to a maritime carrier, the Danish company AP Moller, operating under the trade name of Maersk Line. On 29 June 2012, during a stopover at another port, one of the six containers loaded on behalf of CFTO was damaged during a transhipment operation when another container fell onto it.

CFTO credited Kerevitas with the price of the undelivered goods. CFTO and its insurer, Helvetia Assurances SA, then sued 'the company Maersk Line' as well as Le Roux in France for reimbursement of the value of the lost goods and for payment of appraisal costs. AP Moller intervened in the proceedings and raised, as a preliminary question, the jurisdictional incompetence of the Commercial Court of Quimper in favour of the High Court of Justice of London. The Rennes Court of Appeal confirmed that the French courts had jurisdiction. AP Moller appealed in cassation.

AP Moller argued that, by virtue of art 23 of Regulation EC No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters (the Regulation), CFTO was bound by the London jurisdiction clause in Maersk Line's general conditions, to which reference was made in the bill of lading drawn up by the company for the transport of the goods shipped by CFTO. It followed from arts 1 and 3 of the Hague-Visby Rules that the contract of carriage was a contract binding the shipper and the carrier. It did not matter that it was concluded through a commission agent. In this case, it was not disputed that CFTO had the quality of a shipper, so that it was necessarily a party to the transport contract. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that CFTO did not have the capacity of a party to the contract of carriage, so that it was not bound by the bill of lading, whereas the shipper was necessarily party to the contract of carriage, and it was unimportant that a freight forwarder intervened. By contrast, the trial Judges correctly applied the limitation of liability provided for in art 4.5.a of the Hague-Visby Rules, which govern only the question of the contractual liability of the carrier against the shipper, which follows from the definition of the 'carrier' in article 1 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal thereby violated arts 1 and 3 of the Hague-Visby Rules.

AP Moller also criticised the Court's setting aside of an expert report on packaging defects. The Hague-Visby Rules provide that the carrier is not responsible for the damage if it adduces proof of 'excepted cases', in particular of insufficient packaging. Where the victim contributed by its own fault to the damage, the carrier was partially exempt from its responsibility. By finding that AP Moller was solely responsible for the damage, without investigating whether CFTO had not committed a fault in the stuffing of the goods which contributed to its own damage, the Court of Appeal deprived its decision of a legal basis with regard to arts 4.2 and 4.3 of the Hague-Visby Rules.

CFTO argued that it did not directly contract with Maersk Line, having entrusted Le Roux with the mission of looking for a carrier capable of conveying the goods from Senegal to Türkiye. Consequently, CFTO did not have the status of party to the contract of carriage, and its claim against Maersk Line was not contractual, but quasi-tortious. CFTO was unaware of Maersk's general conditions, and therefore of the jurisdiction clause invoked by AP Moller. In terms of art 6 of the Regulation, CFTO was entitled to sue in France, as Le Roux was domiciled in France, and there was a 'close relationship' between the claims against Le Roux and against AP Moller. Both claims should be tried by a single Court, in this case the Commercial Court of Quimper.

Held: Cassation appeal dismissed.

The Court of Appeal judgment held that CFTO, having entrusted Le Roux, its commission agent, with the task of finding a carrier capable of conveying the goods from Senegal to Türkiye, did not directly contract with Maersk Line and, therefore, did not have the status of a party to the maritime transport contract. The judgment also observed that CFTO was not acting on a contractual basis but on a quasi-tortious basis, expressly invoking art 1382 of the Civil Code.

Given these findings and assessments, the Court of Appeal held correctly that CFTO was not a party to the transport contract and therefore legally justified its decision. The remaining appeal arguments, which proceed from an erroneous postulate, are therefore unfounded.