In March 2006, Anna Noboa and Ceaser Noboa (the plaintiffs) were passengers on a cruise ship. Anna Noboa claimed to have been injured on 22 March 2006 by slipping and falling on used and/or wet towels left on the cabin's floor.

On 19 March 2008, the plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court of the Southern District of New York seeking damages. The MSC Lirica, a cruise liner vessel owned by MSC Crociere SpA, and MSC Cruises USA were the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the injury was due to the negligence and failure of the defendants' crew and personnel to take reasonable care under the circumstances.

On 30 May 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint was time-barred. The defendants contended that the contract set a one-year time limit to bring suit for claims of injuries occurring on any voyage that included a United States port. The defendants relied on para 26 of the passenger ticket contract, which provided in relevant part,

(A) All claims against the Company or the Cruise Ship for death, illness, emotional stress or personal injury to a Passenger or for loss or damage to luggage or other property shall be time barred as follows: (i) For voyages not including a U.S.A. port, claims shall be time barred after two (2) years from the date of disembarkation as provided by Article 16 of the Athens Convention. (ii) For voyages including a U.S.A. port, claims shall be time barred after one (1) year from the date of disembarkation.

The passenger ticket contract referred to the plaintiffs' passenger ticket, embarkation coupon, and the attached passenger contract.

On the first page of the ticket, below the cruise trip's itinerary, in small but legible font, it stated: 'Issued subject to terms of passenger contract (attached). Please read terms and conditions attached (continued on reverse side)'.

Similarly, the second page advised: 'IMPORTANT NOTICE–READ BEFORE USING' and instructed the recipient of a MSC Cruises Embarkation Coupon or Passenger Ticket to carefully read all the terms and conditions of the contract, 'including clauses 16 to 26 which relate to ... applicable law, court jurisdiction, limitations of liability, limitations of time for filing notices of claim and time limits for filing suits'.

Furthermore, the contract itself began 'NOTICE TO PASSENGER' and directed passengers to read the terms and conditions, specifically referencing cll 20-26, which covered venue and time limits for filing suit. The time limitation clause found in para 26 of the contract was within the range of provisions highlighted in the notice to passengers, and appeared in legible typeface and in a style consistent with all the other terms and conditions.

Finally, para 21 of the passenger ticket contract provided in relevant part:

21. JURISDICTION

(A) For voyages that do not include a port in U.S.A., all claims arising out of this Contract shall be brought in and be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Naples, Italy.

(B) For voyages that include a port in U.S.A., all claims arising out of this contract shall be brought in, and be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

In opposition to this motion, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not reasonably communicate this purported time bar, because the provisions in the passenger ticket contract were ambiguous. The plaintiffs first argued that because the clause used the word 'voyage' instead of 'sea-going vessel ... transporting passengers', the phrase used in 46 USC § 183b(a), passengers are led to believe that only destination ports, and not embarkation or disembarkation ports, counted when determining whether their trip included a US port. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' time-limitation clause was confusing because it included a two-year time bar and referenced art 16 of the Athens Convention 1974, instead of solely duplicating the one-year language set forth in 46 USC § 183b(a).

Held: Motion to dismiss granted.

The limitations clause of the contract is enforceable. The physical appearance of the passenger ticket contract reasonably communicated to the plaintiffs that any suit must be initiated within one year after disembarkation. The parties did not dispute that the plaintiffs filed their complaint almost two years after the plaintiffs disembarked from the defendants' vessel. The plaintiffs' claims are time-barred and dismissed.

Under 46 USC § 30508, previously codified as 46 USC § 183b(a), the owner, manager, or agent of a vessel transferring passengers between ports in the United States, or between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country, must allow a claimant at least one year from the date of injury to file a civil action for personal injury or death: see 46 USC § 30508. As such, the Second Circuit has held that a sea carrier may contractually limit the time period in which passengers can file suit for injury, provided that the time period is at least one year and the carrier reasonably communicates the existence and importance of the limitation to the passenger: see Ward v Cross Sound Ferry 273 F 3d 520, 523 (2d Cir 2001) (Ward); Spataro v Kloster Cruise, Ltd 894 F 2d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir 1990) (construing Silvestri v Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione 388 F 2d 11, 17 (2d Cir 1968)).

Although 46 USC § 183b(a) was revised and recodified as 46 USC § 30508(b) on 6 October 2006, the requirements pertinent to the instant motion were unaltered. At all relevant times, injured passengers were entitled to at least six months from the date of injury to give notice of a claim, and at least one year from the date of injury to initiate suit: see 46 USC § 30508(b).

The reasonableness of any particular passenger ticket's time limitation clause is determined by the Court as a matter of law: see Ames v Celebrity Cruises No 97 Civ 0065, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 11559, at *11, 1998 WL 427694 (SDNY, 29 July 1998). In deciding whether this standard of reasonableness is met, the Second Circuit has adopted a two-prong inquiry focusing on: (1) the physical appearance of the ticket itself; and (2) the circumstances surrounding the purchase and subsequent retention of the ticket: Ward, 273 F 3d 523. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the defendants satisfy the second prong. The plaintiffs' argument that the time limitation clause should be enforced falls under the first prong: 'whether the physical characteristics of the ticket itself "reasonably communicated to the passenger the existence therein of important terms and conditions" that affected the passenger's legal rights'.

Courts in the Southern District of New York have found that the physical appearance of a ticket reasonably communicated a time limitation clause where, as in the present case, the ticket contains clear and conspicuous notices that passengers were bound to important terms and conditions contained therein. In this case, the plaintiffs did not suggest that they were unaware of the time limitation clause because the actual appearance of the passenger ticket contract failed to reasonably communicate the provision's existence. Passengers were warned of important terms and conditions within the contract, including time limitations for filing claims and lawsuits.

Despite the plaintiffs' arguments, no ambiguity existed. First, in the context of a cruise operator issuing ticket/contracts to its cruise passengers, the word 'voyage' is a clear and unambiguous reference to the cruise in its entirety. The plaintiffs' argument that a 'voyage' does not include the port from which the cruise departs, or to which the cruise returns, stretches the term beyond any reasonable meaning. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs' cruise began in Florida, travelled to foreign ports, and returned to Florida, the plaintiffs' cruise unquestionably included a US port, and the one-year contractual limitation period applies.

Second, the reference to a two-year limitation for claims arising out of a trip that did not include a US port, pursuant to the Athens Convention 1974, did not make the time limitation clause ambiguous. The time limitation clause in the passenger ticket contract unambiguously presents two potential deadlines by which any action for damages must be filed: (1) if a passenger travels on a cruise that includes at least one US port, in accordance with 46 USC § 183b(a), that passenger has one year to file any action for damages; (2) if a passenger travels on a cruise that does not include at least one US port, in accordance with art 16 of the Athens Convention 1974, that passenger has two years to file any action for damages. Thus, because the plaintiffs' cruise included a US port, namely, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the plaintiffs were clearly subject to the one-year time bar.

Moreover, the plaintiffs' alleged in their complaint that the '[v]enue in the Southern District of New York is proper due to the fact that this matter involves a voyage that included a port in the United States of America, pursuant to the passenger ticket' flatly contradicts the plaintiffs' contention that the word 'voyage' is ambiguous and that the cruise did not involve a US port. In fact, the plaintiffs concede that their cruise included a US port. Moreover, like the time limitation clause in the passenger ticket contract, the contract has one provision that governs jurisdiction for trips that include a US port, and a separate provision for voyages that do not include a US port. In light of the plaintiffs' apparent ability to comprehend and apply the terms of the venue clause, the Court declined to believe that the plaintiffs had difficulty navigating the very similarly worded time-limitation clause.