This admiralty case arose from a collision in 2017 in the west-bound lane of the traffic separation scheme (TSS) of the Singapore Strait. The USS John S McCain, a 9,000-ton US Navy guided-missile destroyer, had been cruising alongside the M/V Alnic, a 39,000-ton oil tanker. In a matter of minutes, the McCain overtook the Alnic and turned suddenly to its left - directly in front of the tanker. The Alnic's bow pierced the broadside of the destroyer, flooding compartments with seawater and fuel within seconds. Ten Navy sailors were killed and dozens more were injured. Both vessels also sustained significant damage.

The petitioner, the owner of the Alnic, began these proceedings by seeking exoneration from - or alternatively, limitation of - liability for the collision. The Court then ordered any claimants to file claims arising from the collision. The Court has split this case into two trial phases. In Phase I, to which this judgment relates, the Court apportions liability for the collision between the petitioner and the United States, and calculates the two parties' respective damages. Assuming that the petitioner is found at least partially liable for the collision in Phase I, in Phase II the Court will adjudicate the personal injury and wrongful death claims by the seafarer claimants against the petitioner.

Held: Both vessels were responsible for the collision: the Court apportions 80% of fault to the McCain and 20% of fault to the Alnic, and declines to limit the petitioner's liability.

This Court has determined that Singapore law applies to substantive matters of liability in this case: see Re Energetic Tank Ltd (CMI655). Singapore courts follow the doctrine of stare decisis, and consider admiralty precedent from Common Law countries like the United Kingdom and United States as persuasive authority. Aside from case law, Singapore has enacted legislation that applies to collisions, including the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (Cap IA3, 2020 Rev Ed) and the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Collisions at Sea) Regulations (Cap 179, reg 10, 1990 Rev Ed).

The elements of negligence under Singapore law are substantially the same as those under US admiralty law: 'Typically, claimants have to establish breach of duty (that a vessel owes a duty of care to other vessels is well-established) that caused or contributed to the collision and damage': The Dream Star [2018] 4 SLR 473 [47] (CMI61).

To gauge a vessel's duty of care, Singapore courts look to 'the exercise of "good seamanship" which is tantamount to the exercise of reasonable skill or care expected of a competent/prudent seaman to prevent the vessel from doing injury': The Dream Star [47]; The Mount Apo and Hanjin Ras Laffan [2019] 4 SLR 909 [97] (CMI322). This 'good seamanship' standard is informed by international safety Conventions. See The Dream Star [47]; The Mount Apo [97]. The relevant safety Convention here is the COLREGS, a series of navigational 'rules of the road' designed to help vessels avoid collisions by acting predictability. Both Singapore and the US have codified the COLREGS as law.

Singapore's Maritime Conventions Act 1911 provides that where two vessels in a collision are both at fault, liability is divided in proportion to the degree of those faults. The Court apportions liability equally only if 'it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault'. Under Singapore precedent, the Court compares each vessel's faults qualitatively, not quantitatively, by analysing the degree to which each vessel's mistakes caused the collision (and the resulting damage), as well as the degree to which each vessel was culpable for those mistakes: see eg The Dream Star [49], [127]; The Mount Apo [95]. Singapore has also ratified the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, which imposes a similar framework. Under the Brussels Convention, courts consider both 'the relative culpability of each vessel and the relative extent to which the culpability of each caused the collision': Otal Invs Ltd v MV Clary 494 F 3d 40, 63 (2d Cir 2007) (CMI351).

There is no formula for apportioning liability; the Court simply makes a 'broad commonsensical assessment': The Mount Apo [207]. Ultimately, 'allocation of liability for damages, requiring consideration of matters not readily amenable to precise analysis, does not oblige an admiralty judge to do more than provide ultimate percentages of allocation, accompanied only by sufficient explanation to provide a reviewing court with some general understanding of the basis for the decision': Otal 63. Accordingly, the Court allocates fault between the two vessels on a percentage basis.

The Court finds that the McCain is primarily - 80% - at fault for creating a scenario where collision between the vessels was either inevitable, or all-but inevitable. However, the Alnic bears significant blame - 20% - for its failure to take any meaningful action to minimise the carnage caused by the collision.

Even though the petitioner faces liability for 20% of the collision, it could still limit that liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 USC ss 30501 ff, to the value of the Alnic and its freight, which the parties have stipulated is USD 16,768,480. If liability were limited, the claimants would only be able to recover pro rata from that limitation fund: 46 USC s 30507. But on the other hand, if the petitioner had 'privity or knowledge' of fault, its liability 'for the full extent' of any damages will be unlimited: 46 USC s 30505(b).

The Court's analysis under the Limitation of Liability Act proceeds in two steps. At step one, a claimant must prove negligence by the vessel whose owner seeks to limit liability. The claimants have met their burden at step one; the Court has allocated 20% of the liability for the collision to the Alnic. Thus, the petitioner's attempt to limit its liability hinges on step two.

At step two, the burden shifts to the owner to prove that it lacked privity or knowledge of the negligence on board its vessel. Where the owner is a corporation like the petitioner, privity or knowledge includes that of a managing agent, officer, or supervising employee of the vessel. Privity or knowledge can be actual or constructive, and is present where the exercise of reasonable diligence could have prevented the commission of the act. Thus, the key question for limiting liability is not what the corporation's officers and managers actually knew, but what they objectively ought to have known. The evidence is clear that the petitioner had privity or knowledge of the significant problems on board the Alnic that contributed to the collision. Accordingly, its petition to limit its liability is denied.

The petitioner and the United States have stipulated to the damages their vessels sustained from the collision, excluding interest. The United States suffered USD 185,000,000 in damages to the McCain, whose repairs took 450 days. The petitioner suffered USD 442,445 in damages to the Alnic, whose repair period is unknown.

As with liability, the Court has held that Singapore law governs the calculation of damages in this case. Under Singapore law, the Court awards damages in proportion to each party's allocation of liability. Those damages are then offset: see The Dream Star [134]. Accordingly, the United States shall recover 20% of its USD 185,000,000 in damages, and the petitioner shall recover 80% of its USD 442,445 in damages, with those damages offset.

The Court acknowledges the counterintuitive reality that the United States shall recover the greater amount in damages despite bearing most of the responsibility for the collision. That reality arises out of 'the peculiar nature of the vessel struck - a fragile [destroyer] of the United States Navy': Nat'l Shipping Co of Saudi Arabia v United States 95 F Supp 2d 482, 495-96 (ED Va 2000). But while providing a larger award to the more culpable party might appear 'somewhat inequitable', that inequity 'is illusory, because the relative fault of the parties has already been taken into consideration' when apportioning liability: ibid, quoting City of Milwaukee v Cement Division, Nat Gypsum Co 515 US 189, 198, 115 S Ct 2091, 132 L Ed 2d 148 (1995)).

Having concluded that the petitioner shall not be exonerated from liability, the wrongful death and personal injury claims by the seafarer claimants against the petitioner shall proceed in Phase II. The Court reserves decision on two issues that were not relevant to the Phase I trial. First, the Court reserves decision on whether the petitioner may seek contribution and/or indemnity from the United States in Phase II. The Court accordingly retains jurisdiction over the United States as a party until that issue is resolved. Second, the Court reserves decision on whether the seafarer claimants have a right to a jury trial in Phase II.

[For the unsuccessful appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, see Re Energetic Tank Inc, Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 22-1765-cv(L), 2024 WL 3544480, 2024 US App LEXIS 18483, 26 July 2024 (CMI2512).]