On 26 July 1970, the Monte Ulia struck No 4 Coryton Jetty off Shellhaven along the river Thames, following an emergency action to avoid the Banco.

The allision resulted in losses. The Banco ran aground, causing damage of about GBP 12,000. The jetty and nearby oil installations also suffered damage estimated at GBP 9 million. Nearby small crafts were damaged extensively. The incident also caused oil to spill and pollute the river's north shore.

Several claims were made against the owners of the Monte Ulia (the plaintiffs). The Mobil Oil Co, the owner of the jetty, claimed GBP 1.25 million for rebuilding the jetty and its equipment. The small craft owners claimed compensation for their damage. The Port of London Authority claimed costs for cleaning up the oil pollution. Salvage tugs also claimed salvage reward. The plaintiffs resisted all these claims.

The plaintiffs alleged that the fault lay with the Banco - the negligent navigation or management of the Banco caused the allision. The plaintiffs sought damages from Beagle Shipping Ltd (the defendants) for loss and expense. The plaintiffs served arrest warrants on seven vessels - Banco, Petro, Shell Spirit I, Shell Spirit II, Toro, Ulco, and Uno - all owned by the defendants. The plaintiffs also claimed an indemnity or contribution for any damages payable to third parties injured by the collision.

The defendants applied to set aside the service of the writ of summons and discharge the arrest warrants save the Banco. Only the arrest of the Banco was lawful. The defendants argued that the Admiralty Court did not have jurisdiction, and that the service of writs and arrest warrants abused the court process.

The dispute involved the interpretation of s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956, which provides that in a claim for damage done by a ship, the Admiralty jurisdiction:

may (whether the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on the ship or not) be invoked by an action in rem against - (a) that ship, if at the time when the action is brought it is beneficially owned as respects all the shares therein by that person; or (b) any other ship which, at the time the action is brought, is beneficially owned as aforesaid.

The trial Judge held that s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 only allowed the plaintiffs to arrest one of the defendants' ships; either the offending ship, or any other ship which the defendants owned. Interpreting the word 'or' to mean 'and/or' would stretch the meaning too far, even though it might bear a wider interpretation to other parts of the same Act. The words 'any other ship' meant 'ship' in the singular and not in the plural - Parliament did not use an expression like 'any ships which may be beneficially owned'. Accordingly, the Judge set aside the service of the writ of summons on the Petro, Shell Spirit I, Shell Spirit II, Toro, Ulco, and Uno, and discharged those arrest warrants for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

Lord Denning MR: In the 17th and 18th centuries, the ordinary mode of commencing an Admiralty suit was by arresting the person of the defendant, their goods, the offending ship, or any other ships or goods of the defendant within the jurisdiction. The arrest was to make the defendant post bail or provide a fund to secure compliance with the judgment, if and when it was obtained against them.

If the defendant entered an appearance, the action in rem proceeded as an action in personam. This meant that a judgment against the defendant could be executed against any of its property within the jurisdiction, whether on its other ships or any other goods. (The Dictator; The Gemma [1899] P 285; The Dupleix [1912] P 8).

If the defendant did not enter an appearance, the action would only operate against the arrested ship. If judgment was entered in default of appearance, it could be enforced by the sale of the ship, but not against the defendant personally (cp Castrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414, 432).

The right to arrest a ship was coterminous with the maritime lien. The maritime lien existed only in respect of the offending ship and for claims such as salvage, wages and collision damages. Without a maritime lien, there was no right to arrest a ship. In 1885, the right to arrest was extended to cover necessaries beyond a maritime lien (The Heinrich Bjorn (1885) 10 PD 44) but only to the ship itself for which the necessaries were supplied, and not to any other ship. The procedure in rem to arrest a ship only applied to the ship which related to the cause of action and not to any other property of the defendant unconnected with the cause of action (see The Beldis [1936] P 51). Therefore, a claimant could only arrest the offending ship for its claim if it could get hold of this ship. Nevertheless, the claimant could still arrest the ship for any claim in which it had a maritime lien, even if the ship had been sold to a bona fide purchaser (Harmer v Bell (The Bold Buccleugh) (1852) 7 Moo PCC 267).

The Arrest Convention 1952 was held in Brussels to address different countries' different rules of law regarding the arrest of seagoing ships. Some countries, like England, only permitted the arrest of the offending ship, whereas many Continental countries allowed the arrest of both the offending ship and any other ship belonging to the same owner. A compromise was reached, allowing for the arrest of one ship, either the offending ship or any other ship belonging to the same owner, but not more.

The Arrest Convention 1952 only received limited international support. The United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Egypt and some other countries ratified it, but the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Japan and other countries did not.

In 1956, the British Parliament passed the Administration of Justice Act 1956 to give effect to the Arrest Convention 1952. Under the Convention, the plaintiff could arrest any other ship belonging to the same owner that came to England. This was advantageous to plaintiffs in England - there was nothing to arrest after a collision because the offending ship would have sunk or not come to these shores.

When an Act of Parliament is passed to give effect to an International Convention, the Courts can refer to that Convention for assistance in construing the Act (Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116; Post Office v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 1 QB 740), even without mentioning the Convention.

The word 'or' in s 3(4) expresses an alternative, like the phrase 'one or the other'. This interpretation of the word 'or' aligns with art 3.3 of the Arrest Convention 1952. In addition, the word 'ship' in the phrase 'any other ship' meant 'ship' and not 'ships'.

Accordingly, the Admiralty jurisdiction in rem may be invoked either against the offending ship or against any other ship in the same ownership, but not against both (see The St Elefterio [1957] P 179, 185).

Megaw LJ: Previously, admiralty procedure was limited to the arrest or seizure of the allegedly offending vessel alone. Jurisdiction in rem could not be established by the arrest or seizure of any other vessel, whether a sister vessel or not or any other property (The Beldis).

The Administration of Justice Act 1956 expanded the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court in rem but the extent of this expansion was unclear. Could the plaintiff arrest all vessels owned by the defendant, as and when found within the jurisdiction; or only one vessel, but with the benefit that the vessel to be arrested need not be the allegedly offending one?

The word 'or' in s 3(4) unambiguously expresses an alternative. If it were ambiguous, it would be necessary to consider the provisions of the Arrest Convention 1952. Although the United Kingdom did not ratify the Convention until 18 March 1959, the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 relating to the Admiralty jurisdiction were, at least to some extent, enacted to bring the law of this country in line with the Convention.

The words 'any other ship' do not include the plural. Article 3.3 of the Arrest Convention 1952 prohibits the arrest of more than one vessel by a plaintiff in respect of a maritime claim. If the plaintiffs' construction of s 3(4) were correct, Parliament would contradict the international obligation which Her Majesty's Government accepted by ratifying the Arrest Convention 1952, instead of giving effect to it.

It was inevitable that there would be minor discrepancies in the translation of an International Convention into domestic law and procedure. However, no provision in the Arrest Convention 1952 displaced the presumption that any ambiguity should be resolved by interpreting the provision in accordance with the UK's international obligations.

Cairns LJ: The wording of s 3(4) is unambiguous. It provides alternatives - the offending ship or one other - which displace the rule that the singular includes the plural.

Questions of convenience only arise when words are ambiguous and when one construction is much more convenient than the other. It would have been convenient for any plaintiff in any division of the Court to secure payment for the judgment they hoped to obtain. This privilege was only available to plaintiffs in admiralty actions and had been narrowly confined until 1956. Even with the narrower construction, the Administration of Justice Act 1956 still conferred a valuable additional privilege in events where the offending vessel may have been lost, seriously damaged, smaller than other vessels in the fleet, or may never have entered British waters. It would not be right to further extend this privilege on an ambiguity.

Parliament could not have intended a wider meaning of s 3(4). If the wider construction had been intended, it could have been more simply expressed by omitting (a) and (b) after 'against' and simply saying 'any ship or ships beneficially owned at the time the action is brought by the owner of the ship in connection with which the claim arose'. Alternatively, the conjunction 'and' would be more appropriate than 'or'. Further, if Parliament had intended to give rights extending beyond those provided by the Convention, it should have used clear language to emphasise the difference.

The Arrest Convention 1952 could assist construction. Although the Administration of Justice Act 1956 does not mirror the Arrest Convention 1952, it must have been intended to achieve a broadly similar result. The difference might be due to differences of procedure between this country and others. It may be that in some countries, proceedings are initiated by arrest instead of by writ.