Jeanty filed a motion to remand this case to the state courts on the basis that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 USC § 30701 ff, was inapplicable.

In 2018, Jeanty hired the defendant, Antillean Marine Shipping Corp (Antillean), to ship his truck from Florida to Haiti. After the truck was delivered to Antillean, it disappeared. On 9 November 2020, Jeanty sued Antillean in Florida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit, alleging six causes of action under Florida state law. On 11 November 2022, Antillean successfully removed the case to the federal courts on the basis that COGSA 'governs all transportation of goods by sea between the United States and foreign ports from the time they are loaded on or the time they are discharged from the ship'. According to Antillean, '[t]he truck was to be transported pursuant to ocean carrier Antillean's regular form bill of lading, which incorporates the terms and conditions of COGSA through its Clause Paramount, making COGSA applicable to the entire time the cargo is in the custody of the carrier, including the period of time prior to the loading of the cargo on board the vessel and after discharge of the vessel.'

Jeanty did not challenge removal, because he was under the impression that the truck had disappeared at some point during the transit to Haiti. Antillean then moved to strike out Jeanty's claims based on state law, on the basis that 'COGSA completely preempts the field'. However, in July 2023, Jeanty discovered that Antillean never transported the truck as it lacked the necessary customs documentation. So, rather than process the truck for shipment, Antillean left the truck on its Florida lot for over a year before selling it for scrap on the basis that it was abandoned cargo. On 13 September 2023, Antillean filed a counterclaim against Jeanty for USD 945,523.25 of storage fees for the '601 days of unjust and undue delay of shipment and clear abandonment of his vehicle'.

Two weeks later, Jeanty filed a motion to remand, arguing that COGSA does not apply here because the truck 'was sold for profit' before ever being loaded onto an Antillean vessel, and because Antillean 'testified that there was no valid agreement to ship and no bill of lading'. Jeanty contended that 'this is a storage lien matter governed by Florida Statute § 83.806'. Antillean argued that it had issued a warehouse receipt upon receipt of the truck, which read: 'Received the above described cargo in apparent good order and condition, except as noted, for shipment to the indicated port, subject to the terms and conditions contained in the Carrier's regular form Bill of Lading and Tariff’. Antillean's form bill of lading's terms and conditions expressly state that COGSA governs 'between the time of receipt of the Goods by the Carrier at the port of loading and the time of delivery by the Carrier at the port of discharge'.

Held: Motion to remand dismissed.

COGSA 'governs "all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade"': Polo Ralph Lauren LP v Tropical Shipping & Constr Co Ltd 215 F 3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir 2000) (CMI1536). When it applies, COGSA provides an exclusive remedy, barring all other theories of liability. Indeed, 'COGSA affords one cause of action for lost or damaged goods which, depending on the underlying circumstances, may sound louder in either contract or tort': Polo 1221. When COGSA applies, any claims advanced under theories of liability outside of COGSA's statutory scheme must be dismissed. COGSA jurisdiction is normally triggered when the cargo in question has been loaded onto the carrier's vessel: Polo 1220 ('COGSA governs during the time after cargo is loaded and before it is removed from the ship'.) The statute itself makes this clear. See 46 USC § 30701, Stat Notes § 13: 'This Act shall apply to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade'; see also Stat Notes § 1: 'The term "carriage of goods" covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship.' Because Jeanty's truck was sold before it could be loaded onto one of Antillean's vessels, COGSA's application here is a bit more complicated: see Underwriters at Int Under Bailee Ins Pol'y No 09RTAMIA1158 v SeaTruck Inc 858 F Supp 2d 1334, 1338 (SD Fla 2012) (Scola J) (CMI1546) (noting that a theft of cargo from a carrier's shore-side warehouse 'undisputedly occurred outside of the default loading-to-delivery period of COGSA application').

By its own terms, COGSA empowers parties to a shipping contract to extend the statute's coverage to an earlier point in time: see 46 USC § 30701, Stat Notes § 7:

Nothing in this Act shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any agreement, stipulation, condition, reservation, or exemption as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in connection with the custody and care and handling of the goods prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which the goods are carried by sea.

It has therefore become common practice for carriers to 'extend COGSA to pre-loading ... periods', during which they have 'actual physical custody of or responsibility for the cargo': Underwriters 1339.

AAA Int'l Freight Forwarding Grp Inc v King Ocean Serv de Venezuela SA, 2000 WL 33956708 (SD Fla, 13 June 2000) (Moore J) is instructive. The shipper there contracted with a carrier to ship a container from Florida to Venezuela. After the carrier took control of the container - but before the container was loaded onto the carrier's vessel - armed men broke into the container and stole its contents. The shipper sued the carrier, alleging that, because no bill of lading was ever issued by the carrier, it was strictly liable as a common carrier of goods for the loss of the shipper's goods. The carrier responded by filing a motion for summary judgment against the shipper, claiming in part that: (1) the parties’ rights and liabilities are governed by the bill of lading which would have issued had the cargo not been lost prior to being loaded aboard the vessel; and (2) the bill of lading incorporated COGSA for all relevant time periods. The Court agreed, noting that 'it is well settled in this Circuit that the bill of lading that would have issued in the ordinary course of business represents the contract governing the relationship between the shipper and carrier even if it was not actually issued'. In so holding, the Court quoted from Luckenbach SS Co v Am Mills Co 24 F 2d 704, 705 (5th Cir 1928) for the proposition that:

[the carrier] was required by law to issue a bill of lading ... . [The shipper] is presumed to know the law, and therefore must have known the terms and conditions on which the goods were received and would be transported would be contained in a bill of lading to be issued later ... . [A]n implied understanding arose from common business experience that the carrier would issue such a bill of lading as it was custom to issue to shippers in the usual course of its business ... . [A] shipper, in the absence of a special contract, must be presumed to deliver his goods on the terms and conditions usually and customarily imposed by the carrier in the regular course of business.

As in AAA, this is a dispute between a shipper and a carrier who had previously done business together. As in AAA, the carrier's regular form bill of lading triggered COGSA coverage when the carrier took control of the cargo. As in AAA, the cargo went missing while in the carrier's control, but before it had been loaded onto the carrier's vessel. And, as in AAA, a specific bill of lading had not yet been issued when the cargo was lost. Finding AAA's reasoning persuasive, this Court reaches the same conclusion and holds that Antillean's regular form bill of lading governs this dispute, even though no specific bill of lading was ever issued.