The plaintiffs, owners of the motor tug Sauria, brought a salvage action against the owners of two barges and the cargoes laden onboard those barges. These defendants intended to seek an indemnity from a third party (owners of another vessel) in the event of a salvage award. Salvage was denied by the defendants. By a letter in December 1949, the plaintiffs were suggesting some cheap way of settling the dispute, such as arbitration. Three days later, on 23 December 1949, the defendants' solicitors replied that they had been in touch with those concerned in the third-party proceedings and they made a suggestion for settlement of the whole dispute by payment of a small sum. The defendants' solicitors awaited a reply. By this time some 14 months of the two-year limitation period had already elapsed. The letter written by the defendants' solicitors was never answered. The matter was allowed to go to sleep until November 1950, over a month after the expiration of the two years, when the plaintiffs' solicitors wrote to the defendants' solicitors. The writ in the action was not issued until 2 February 1951. The defendants sought an order staying all further proceedings.

Held: Proceedings stayed.

The Court declined to extend time because it would effectively render s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK) (the MCA) nugatory. Because all the parties concerned are 'local inhabitants' on the River Thames, only the following parts of s 8 of the MCA apply to the present action:

No action shall be maintainable to enforce any claim or lien against a vessel or her owners in respect of ... any salvage services, unless proceedings therein are commenced within two years from the date when the ... salvage services were rendered ...

Provided that any Court having jurisdiction to deal with an action to which this section relates may, in accordance with the Rules of Court, extend any such period, to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit. ...

Section 8 of the MCA has been considered by Hill J whose view should be followed. The discretion to extend time (The Llandovery Castle [1920] P 119, 125) 'can only be used in favour of a plaintiff if there are special circumstances which create a real reason why the statutory limitation should not take effect'.

The MCA 'gives the defendants a right … that can only be taken away on sufficient grounds' (The PLM 8 [1920] P 236, 240). See also The HMS Archer [1919] P 1 and The Kashmir [1923] P 85. There is no doubt as to what the MCA means. The action is not to be maintained unless the person who is out of time and who seeks to bring the action satisfies the burden of showing the Court that there is some good and substantial reason for the exercise of the Court's discretion in favour of allowing the action to proceed.

There was no good and sufficient reason why the Court's discretion should be exercised in favour of the plaintiffs in this case. There is no reason why the matter should have been allowed to go to sleep as it did. The fact that arbitration was being suggested, or an offer being made and negotiations being conducted, does not justify the plaintiffs' delay.

There are at least two reasons why time should not be extended. First, there are other interested parties concerned in this case. If the action were allowed to proceed and if a salvage award were to be made against these defendants, these defendants would wish to claim indemnity against a third party. That, presumably, would be an action for damage, which is also governed by s 8 of the MCA. Any proceedings now launched by the defendants against the third parties would also be out of time. The Court was aware of a letter written by the solicitors for the third party, addressed to the defendants' solicitors, pointing out that this matter is now time-barred and that, in those circumstances, they, the solicitors to the third party, would take the point that the action is out of time if they are now asked to indemnify the defendants against anything which the defendants have to pay to the plaintiffs.

That is one respect in which there would be an actual prejudice to the defendants if this action were now allowed to proceed. They might very well find themselves in difficulties - possibly difficulties which they might overcome, but difficulties which would involve them in recourse to litigation - in recovering the indemnity which they think they are entitled to recover against the third party.

The second reason is that extending time in this case would set a bad example. This is a matter which, if not settled in a matter of a week or two, should have been brought before the Court within months at the most. The dilatory conduct in this case revolved around a local affair. The salvage services were rendered in the River Thames; all the parties concerned are in and about London; the solicitors for both sides are well-known practitioners in the City of London. The law's delays have been criticised for centuries. But such criticism has never been particularly severe in relation to the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. Admiralty jurisdiction should not become the victim of criticism as to delay. There were several cases in which substantial actions have been brought on within a few weeks of the occurrence. This should have been done in this case. It would be most unfortunate if others had the idea that the parties' legal advisers were able successfully to protract a small domestic matter beyond the limit of two years laid down by the MCA: in other words, to spin out the law's delays.