This case concerned the interpretation and enforceability of contractual rights under the CRISTAL contract, particularly concerning whether Cristal Ltd could act as the 'sole judge' in determining claims and whether such determinations could exclude Court review. The plaintiffs argued that they had direct contractual rights to compensation under cl 4 and that cl 9, read together with the Rules, could not prevent them from seeking enforcement through the English Courts. The Court examined whether the rules could effectively turn cl 9 into an arbitration clause, whether the 'sole judge' language prevented Court review, and whether implied terms could allow the Court to oversee Cristal's determinations.
Held: The Court dismissed Cristal's contention that its liability was limited to paying whatever amount it determined to be due under the contract.
The contract did not merely oblige Cristal to pay what it determined should be paid; cl 4 created an independent obligation; the contract did not make it a condition precedent of any liability that there should have been a determination; and the contract was not simply providing a party to the contract with the right to have a claim considered by Cristal and a discretion exercised.
What the contract did do was impose on Cristal an obligation to determine validity in accordance with the terms of the contract, and there was nothing which restricted what would normally be the right of a contracting party to assert that Cristal had not so determined it.
Whatever the word 'sole' might mean, the question was ultimately only whether it precluded the Court from considering whether Cristal had determined the validity of the claim in accordance with the terms of the contract. It did not. Neither by construction nor by implication nor by any other method was there any limitation imposed on the power of the Court to consider Cristal’s determinations.
Even if that was wrong, it would be very difficult to see how Cristal, by cl 9 could be the sole judge to the exclusion of the Court in considering whether there had been a waiver or estoppel in relation to cl 8.