This was a cargo claim. The appellant purchased four containers of sand eels from a seller in Aarhus, Denmark, in August 1999, intending to use the goods both for bait for her own fishing fleet and for resale if necessary. The seller of the goods entered into an agreement with the appellant to handle the transport. In 1999, the four containers arrived on the respondent’s ships in Reykjavík, where they were discharged at the respondent's premises.

A dispute arose between the appellant and the respondent as to whether the appellant was liable for the costs of transporting the containers to Ólafsvík. By judgment of the Supreme Court of Iceland on 6 June 2002, the appellant was acquitted of the respondent's claim for payment of the costs of storing the goods at the respondent's premises, as the respondent should have transported the goods to Ólafsvík.

The appellant then sued the respondent for damage to the cargo, which had been in the respondent's custody for almost three years, and was now unusable. The respondent argued, among other things, that the appellant's claim was time-barred. The cargo had arrived in the country in 1999. The appellant's claim is a claim for damages for alleged damage that occurred while the cargo was in the carrier's custody: see art 68.1 of the Shipping Act/Siglingalög No 34/1985 (the Act) [cp art 4.1 of the Hague-Visby Rules]. According to art 215.1.7 of the Act [cp art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules], such claims are time-barred within one year from the time the goods were delivered or should have been delivered.

The Reykjavík District Court held in favour of the respondent. The Court found that the respondent was obligated to transport the goods to the appellant immediately after the goods arrived in the country in 1999. The respondent did not do so due to a dispute between the parties. That dispute was resolved by a Supreme Court judgment in June 2002. Accordingly, the appellant was obligated to pursue her claim within one year from the date on which the Supreme Court judgment was delivered. This claim was filed on 10 December 2003, after the statute of limitations had expired.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

The decision in the appealed judgment is confirmed. The appellant's claim is subject to limitation according to art 215.1.7 of the Act. The starting point of the limitation period according to the statutory provision is the time when the goods were delivered or should have been delivered. By the judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 June 2002, the dispute between the parties regarding the content of the respondent's obligations to return the goods concerned in this case was resolved. It was based on the fact that the respondent was obligated to deliver the goods to Ólafsvík, where the appellant has her place of business. It is clear from the judgment that the respondent was required to fulfil this obligation as a direct consequence of the arrival of the goods in the country in 1999. The limitation period according to the cited legal provision then began to run, and the claim was therefore long past due when the appellant brought this case on 10 December 2003.