The plaintiff, an insurance company acting under an assignment of rights, claimed for damage to a cargo of 155 steel coils carried from Tampico, Mexico, to the Port of Cristobal, Panama, on board the MV Melfi Halifax, in a port to port modality. The carrier discharged the cargo at the port of its destination on 16 May 1997. The consignee removed the merchandise on 21 May 1997. The bill of lading provided for the Hague-Visby rules as the applicable law.

The lawsuit was filed on 20 May 1998 and the certification of presentation of the lawsuit was published the day after in a newspaper. The defendant argued the action was time-barred as the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year time bar, established in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby rules, counting from 16 May 1997 when the cargo was discharged. The lower court rejected the argument, stating that it is not correct to consider that the cargo has been delivered when it is still in the custody of the port authorities, when customs clearance is still pending, and when the consignee is a bank and the notifying party is another company. The Maritime Court considered that it was reasonable to count from the moment of the arrival of the cargo and the moment when an inspection was made. Hence, the claim was filed within a reasonable time. The defendant appealed the decision.

Held: The Civil Branch of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), acting as Court of Maritime Appeals, reversed the decision. The SCJ stated that the carrier complies with its obligation to deliver the goods by giving notice to the consignee that the merchandise is available for removal at the place agreed upon in the contract. If the consignee does not remove it in a timely manner, it assumes the risk from the moment it fails to remove the cargo. From that moment, the carrier is considered released from its responsibility to take care of the goods because it has complied with its obligation of delivering the cargo. The time bar must be counted from the moment when the carrier’s obligations end.

The SCJ asserted that the evidence demonstrated that the discharge of the merchandise took place on 16 May 1997 and the consignee had knowledge of that. For this case, the discharge of the cargo equals its delivery, because the cargo was available for removal without any obstacle for the consignee. If the consignee, for reasons that do not concern the carrier, waited until 21 May 1997 to remove the cargo, this fact cannot affect the determination of the moment in which the limitation period starts running. Therefore, the action was time-barred.