Arendovich Investments Inc (the appellant) contracted with NNR Global Logistics Inc (the respondent) to be its logistical broker to transport a container of copper from China to the United States. The appellant travelled to China and observed the copper being loaded into the container. The door of the container was sealed after the loading. The respondent then accepted the container and issued a bill of lading. The container was transported by ship to Canada, and then by rail and truck to the US. When the container arrived at the US, the appellant found that the seal on the container was different from the original one. The appellant opened the container and found that it contained cement bricks.

The appellant sued the respondent for breach of contract. The respondent moved for summary judgment and argued that COGSA/the Hague Rules governed the appellant's claim because it had issued a bill of lading that indicated that the copper was to be transported by sea. In addition, the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of liability under COGSA/the Hague Rules because it could not show that the copper remained in the container between the time that the container had been sealed and when it was received at the port of discharge. Moreover, the respondent argued that even if it was liable, it could limit its liability to USD 500 per package (USD 8000 in total) under COGSA/the Hague Rules. The appellant countered that COGSA/the Hague Rules did not govern because COGSA/the Hague Rules applied only to carriers. The appellant argued that the respondent acted merely as a broker and it did not physically carry the cargo.

The District Court found that the appellant had successfully stated a claim under COGSA/the Hague Rules, but that COGSA/the Hague Rules limited the respondent's liability to USD 8000.

The appellant filed a motion for the District Court to reconsider its summary judgment order. The appellant maintained that COGSA/the Hague Rules did not apply because the respondent was a broker and not a shipper. The appellant further argued that even if COGSA/ the Hague Rules applied, the respondent could not limit its liability because the respondent did not provide the appellant with a fair opportunity to declare the value of the shipment of the copper. In response, the respondent argued that a motion to reconsider did not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the appellant's motion to seek post-judgment relief was time-barred because the appellant filed the motion more than 28 days after the entry of judgment.

The District Court denied the appellant's motion on the ground that the appellant had not met its burden of establishing that post-judgment relief was warranted. In addition, the appellant's motion was time-barred. The appellant appealed.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for post-judgment relief in the case of newly discovered evidence or extraordinary situations. However, the appellant did not specify any newly discovered evidence, nor did it specify any extraordinary circumstances that might entitle it to deserve any post-judgment relief. In addition, r 59(e) provides that 'a motion to alter or amend a judgment ... be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment'. Thus, the appellant's motion was untimely. The District Court appropriately denied the appellant's motion.