The Titanic was launched in 1912. On its maiden voyage from Southampton to New York, the Titanic collided with an iceberg and sank on 15 April 1912. In 1985, the wreck of the Titanic was discovered at the bottom of the North Atlantic in international waters. In 1987, Titanic Ventures LP (Titanic Ventures) and other institutions voluntarily undertook efforts to salvage the wreck. Titanic Ventures thereafter sold both its interest in the salvage operation and the 1,800 artefacts it had recovered to RMS Titanic Inc (RMST). RMST recovered another 800 artefacts. In 1993, RMST obtained an order from the Court that granted RMST exclusive salvage rights over the wreck and wreck site of the Titanic. In support of its request, RMST presented the Court with a wine decanter salvaged from the Titanic and stated that numerous other artefacts were physically within the district. The Court held that the wine decanter and the artefacts would enable it to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the wreck. The Court held that RMST had an exclusive right to regulate access to the wreck site and photograph the wreck itself.
In 1998, Deep Ocean Expeditions (DOE) proposed an expedition that would allow members of the public to visit the wreck of the Titanic. One of the subscribers was Christopher Haver (Haver). Being aware of this proposed expedition, RMST filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent DOE, among others, from visiting the wreck site to view and photograph the wreck. Haver filed a separate declaratory judgment action against RMST and argued that he had a right to enter the wreck site to observe, video and photograph the Titanic. Haver filed a separate declaratory judgment action against RMST's motion. One of the arguments made by Haver was that the Court could not have exercised in rem jurisdiction over the wreck and the wreck site of the Titanic because the wreck lay in international waters. Thus, Haver argued that the Court had no power to adjudicate salvage rights without in rem jurisdiction.
Held: Motion granted.
According to art 2 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea 1910 (Salvage Convention 1910), salvage law recognises a salvor's right to equitable remuneration. Salvage law also recognises the priority of the first salvor, the right of the salvor in possession to complete its salvage work free of interference by rivals, and the right of the salvor to bring the res into a convenient port to adjudicate the salvage lien. Therefore, the internationally recognised principles governing salvage on the high seas encourage the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over a wreck site to facilitate the salvage operation itself.
RMST brought part of the wreck into the Court seeking to be appointed sole salvor in possession under generally recognised salvage law. It was in the interests of the whole world to have salvage claims decided in a single forum so that multiple, conflicting litigation would be avoided. The whole world was placed on notice of the action in the Court by the publication of notice of the in rem arrest. Moreover, the recognised international rights at stake were minimally infringed upon. Restricting freedom of navigation over a few square miles of the vast North Atlantic Ocean was hardly a significant intrusion. Thus, the Court found that the exercise of constructive in rem jurisdiction over the wreck site of the Titanic to facilitate RMST's salvage operations was reasonable under international law.