This was a prosecution brought by the State of Finland, alleging that a criminal act was committed in the Finnish exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and elsewhere in the Gulf of Finland outside Finnish territorial waters, but with the consequences of the crime occurring in Finland. The State Prosecutors argued that Vadatchkoria, as the master of the tanker Eagle S, flagged to the Cook Islands, together with Egizaryan as first officer, and Chaurasia as second officer, intentionally damaged several power cables. The facts are outlined in R 706/2025/12270 (CMI2715).

The Helsinki District Court held that Finland had no jurisdiction over this matter. The State prosecutors appealed, requesting that the District Court's judgment be overturned, and that the Finnish State be found to have criminal law jurisdiction.

Held: Appeal upheld. The District Court acted incorrectly when, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, it dismissed the criminal charges and claims for damages against Vadatchkoria, Egizaryana, and Chaurasia. Therefore, the judgment of the District Court is overturned. The case is to be referred back to the Helsinki District Court for determination.

In the field of criminal law, the territorial principle is applied as a rule. The territorial principle entails that if a crime is committed in Finland, Finnish criminal law applies to it, and Finnish courts have jurisdiction to deal with it. The territorial principle is also observed in international law. Therefore, if the effects of a crime occur in the territory of Finland, the crime is also committed in Finland according to principles generally recognised in international law (see eg the decision of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration of 21 May 2020 in the Enrica Lexie (No 2015–28) para 840) (CMI470).

The Court of Appeal thus finds that the provisions concerning the scope of application of Finnish criminal law and the jurisdiction of the Court are consistent with the generally recognised rules of international law.

However, the application of national legislation and general principles of international law may be limited in relations between contracting States by provisions contained in Conventions and other international agreements.

Here, the alleged acts were committed on board a vessel flying the flag of the Cook Islands, while the vessel was sailing in the Finnish EEZ. The consequences of the alleged crime occurred in Finland. According to Finnish national law, which corresponds to the territorial principle observed in international law, the alleged crime was therefore committed in Finland. Since the Eagle S was flying the flag of the Cook Islands, the alleged crime was also committed in the Cook Islands (see eg Enrica Lexie para 839).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is generally applicable to maritime transport. Finland and the Cook Islands are parties to UNCLOS. The issue is thus whether UNCLOS contains provisions that grant exclusive criminal jurisdiction to one of the abovementioned States and thus potentially limit the scope of Finnish criminal law and, accordingly, the jurisdiction of Finnish courts.

Article 27 UNCLOS provides for criminal jurisdiction over a foreign ship in innocent passage when the ship is passing through the territorial sea of ​​a coastal State. According to art 27.1, a coastal State may not exercise its criminal jurisdiction over a foreign ship passing through its territorial sea to arrest persons or to conduct investigations into an offence committed on board the ship during its transit, except when: (a) the consequences of the offence extend to the coastal State; (b) the offence is of such a nature as to disturb the peace or public order of the coastal State in the territorial sea; (c) the master of the ship or a diplomatic or consular officer of the State whose flag the ship is flying has requested the assistance of the local authorities; or (d) such action is necessary for the prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

Regarding the EEZ, UNCLOS does not contain a provision equivalent to art 27. Article 58 provides for the rights and obligations of other States in the EEZ of the coastal State. However, the provisions of art 58.1 are not relevant here, since they concern the rights of States to exploit the maritime area of ​​the EEZ. Article 58.2 contains a general reference to the application of arts 88-115 UNCLOS and other relevant rules of international law to the EEZ in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Part relating to the EEZ.

Article 59 UNCLOS provides for the resolution of conflicts relating to the determination of rights and jurisdiction over the EEZ. According to art 59, where UNCLOS does not assign rights or jurisdiction over the EEZ to the coastal State or other States and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and another State(s), this should be resolved in an equitable manner and in the light of all the circumstances, taking into account the importance of the interests in question for the parties concerned and for the international community as a whole.

According to art 92.1 UNCLOS, ships may fly the flag of only one State and are in principle subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. This provision also applies in the EEZ under art 58.2.

According to art 94.1 UNCLOS, each State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag.

Article 97 UNCLOS provides for criminal jurisdiction over the master and crew in matters relating to collision or other maritime incidents. According to art 97.1, in the event of a collision or other maritime incident to which a ship is subject on the high seas or in the EEZ, which renders the master of the ship or any other person in the service of the ship liable under criminal or disciplinary law, criminal or disciplinary proceedings against such person may be brought only before the judicial or administrative authorities of the flag State or of the State of which s/he is a national.

Article 113 UNCLOS obligates States Parties to criminalise the intentional act or negligent omission by which a ship flying its flag or a person subject to its jurisdiction has severed or damaged a submarine cable on the high seas in such a way as to cause the interruption or disruption of telegraph or telephone communications, or, similarly, has severed or damaged a submarine pipeline or high-voltage cable. In Finland, art 27 of the Convention on the High Seas 1958, which corresponds to art 113 UNCLOS, has been implemented by the Act on the Protection of Certain Submarine Cables. According to s 2 of this Act, a person who intentionally or negligently cuts or damages a submarine cable shall be sentenced, unless a more severe penalty is provided for the act elsewhere in the law, to a fine for the breach of a submarine cable.

According to Finnish national law and the territorial principle of international law, Finnish criminal law can thus be applied to the act in question. and the criminal claims against the persons responsible for navigating the Eagle S can be investigated in Finland.

As stated above, art 92 UNCLOS states that the flag State’s ships are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. However, this art does not stipulate which State's criminal law applies to an offence committed both on board a flag State's ship and in the territory of another State on the basis that the consequences have occurred in that other State. The Court of Appeal considers that in these circumstances, the law of either the flag State or the law of the affected State may in principle be applied to the offences. Article 92 UNLCOS does not therefore exclude the application of the Finnish Criminal Code to the criminal charges in question, since the offences have also been committed in Finland. Both States therefore have jurisdiction: Finland under the territorial principle; and the Cook Islands under art 92, but this jurisdiction is concurrent (see Enrica Lexie para 839).

However, art 97 UNCLOS limits this parallel jurisdiction in criminal matters in the case of a collision or other maritime incident involving a ship on the high seas or in the EEZ. If, in such a situation, the master of the ship or any other person in the service of the ship is held criminally liable, criminal proceedings against such a person may be brought only before the judicial or administrative authorities of the flag State or of the State of which s/he is a national. Article 97 UNCLOS provides for the criminal liability of the master of a ship or any other person in the service of a ship in the event of a collision or other maritime incident. The art does not provide for the jurisdiction of the court in criminal proceedings in relation to the crew in other cases.

There is no question of a collision in this case, so it remains to be assessed whether the conduct described in the act is to be considered a maritime incident. The Finnish text is not authentic under art 320 UNCLOS. This must be taken into account when interpreting the meaning of the concepts used in UNCLOS. The term 'incident of navigation' is used in the English text of the agreement, which is authentic.

Article 97.1 UNCLOS is drafted primarily with the aim of ensuring that a person in charge of the navigation of a ship whose conduct has caused a collision, will not have to answer for the collision in a court other than the court of the flag State of the ship or the court of his/her nationality. This aims to change the previous legal situation based on the Lotus case of the Permanent International Court of Justice (SS Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment of 7 September 1927, PCIJ Series A, No 10), according to which in a collision the flag States of both ships have criminal jurisdiction over the crew. The Lotus result was considered unsatisfactory for international shipping and, as a result, criminal jurisdiction was subsequently limited to the flag State of the defendant's vessel or the State of nationality of the defendant (see Enrica Lexie, paras 644-645 and nn). The Lotus judgment and subsequent reforms show that the aim has been to limit the applicable criminal law and criminal jurisdiction to the flag State in a situation where criminal liability related to shipping is at issue.

In the Enrica Lexie decision, the Permanent Court of Arbitration assessed, among other things, what is to be considered a maritime incident for the purposes of applying art 97.1 UNCLOS. The facts of that case differ significantly from those of this case. If the Eagle S had stopped after the authorities had contacted its crew, and the crew had checked the condition of the anchors, at least the last four submarine cables would have remained undamaged. However, this did not happen, but rather information about the anchors was provided to the authorities in a way that was contrary to the truth, and the voyage continued without slowing down the vessel's speed, decreasing engine speed, or investigating the location and attachment of the anchors.

Although an 'incident' is a broader concept than an 'accident', taking into account the context, it implies that it is an accident comparable to a collision that is not intentional in relation to the consequences of the incident. The Court of Appeal considers that the unexpected fall of the anchor and the related damage can be considered an incident and therefore also a maritime accident. However, taking into account the alleged actions of the crew during and after contacting the authorities, and the continuation of dragging the anchor in the circumstances described for more than three hours, the Court of Appeal considers that what happened can no longer be considered a maritime accident within the meaning of art 97.1 UNCLOS.

The Court of Appeal therefore finds that the course of events described in the description of the act does not meet the definition of a maritime incident in the circumstances in question. The fact that damage to submarine cables is presented as an example of a maritime incident in the preparatory works to the Convention on the High Seas (Report to the General Assembly, Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries, 1956) does not give cause to assess the matter differently. The fact that the Contracting States are obliged by art 113 UNCLOS to criminalise damage to submarine cables is irrelevant when assessing the international jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case.

Since art 97.1 UNCLOS does not apply in this case, based on the territorial principle generally recognised in the field of criminal law in Finnish national law and international law, the criminal liability of the crew in relation to the events can be assessed in accordance with Finnish criminal law, and the criminal charges can be heard in Finnish courts.

Although, as stated above, the courts of the Cook Islands also have jurisdiction to hear criminal charges relating to the events under art 92 UNCLOS, and there is thus a positive conflict of jurisdiction between Finland and the Cook Islands, such a conflict must be resolved in accordance with art 59 UNCLOS in a fair and equitable manner, taking into account the importance of the interests in question for the parties concerned and for the international community as a whole. In the circumstances, it can be considered reasonable, in particular taking into account the extent of the criminal consequences caused in Finland, that the criminal charges be heard in Finland, and not in the Cook Islands.