The Port of Geelong Authority (the Authority) brought an action in rem against the Bass Reefer in the amount of AUD 577,481.02. Bass Express Ships Ltd (BES) was the demise charterer of the vessel. The claim was for unpaid priority berthing licence fees, unpaid rent for a parcel of land at the Port of Geelong and outstanding stevedoring services fees.

The defendants accepted the validity of the stevedoring services claim as a general maritime claim under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth), and the money for that claim was paid out on behalf of the ship. However, the plaintiff alleged that its claims for unpaid rent and licence fees were also maritime claims, and the Bass Reefer was subsequently arrested. By notice of motion, the defendants disputed the status of the claims for rent and licence fees as maritime claims, and sought to have the ship released or the writ for its arrest set aside.

The writ for the ship's arrest would remain valid if it was found that both or either of the claims (for the licence fees and unpaid rent) were general maritime claims under ss 4(3)(f), (m) or (p) of the Act.

Held: Notion of motion dismissed. The writ for the ship's arrest was upheld and the ship was to remain under arrest.

Section 4(3)(f) of the Act is about maritime claims that relate to the carriage of goods (or persons) by a ship. Although the phrasing 'relates to' in the section is broad, the Court approved the speech of Lord Keith of Kinkel in Gatoil International Inc v Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co [1985] AC 255 (CMI694), who preferred there to be a 'reasonably direct connection' between the carriage of goods and a maritime claim. As an aside, the Court in this case noted that in arts 1.1.d and 1.1.e of the Arrest Convention 1952, unlike the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), provision was expressly made for bringing admiralty claims against both owners and charterers. It was the former instrument's model that influenced the Act and led to s 4(3)(f).

Was there a reasonably direct connection between the licence and lease agreements and the carriage of goods undertaken by the Bass Reefer on a regular basis so as to satisfy s 4(3)(f)? The Court held that there was not. Even if there was a vague connection between the Bass Reefer and the use of the leased premises as an office space and for handling container cargo, this was not an explicit connection to the ship and the carriage of goods. Further, the priority berthing licence was only used by the ship, and was unrelated to the use of the Bass Reefer itself for carrying goods.

Was there, however, a reasonably direct connection between the licence and lease agreements and the carriage of goods by the Bass Reefer so as to satisfy s 4(3)(m)? This section concerns claims in respect of goods, materials or services supplied to ships for their operation or maintenance. Could the claims for unpaid rent and licence fees be classified as claims in respect of services for the Bass Reefer's operation, as they were not claims for materials or goods?

BES argued that the berth and the sea terminal were provided for its use in running its freight service, and were not supplied to the Bass Reefer, because that ship was not specified or nominated in the lease and licence contracts. The Court stated that it was important to look at the time when services were supplied, and then discern if supply was to the ship itself. Further, the Court thought it would be wrong to limit the meaning of 'services' in s 4(3)(m) to benefits accruing from work and labour.

Although no specific vessel or vessels were named in the written licence and lease agreements between the Authority and BES, it was clear that the Bass Reefer was the only ship used by BES to perform the run between Geelong and Stanley. This was also the only ship taking advantage of the priority berthing licence and of the leased land.

The leased parcel of land was, nonetheless, found to have not been provided to the Bass Reefer for its operation, but rather involved the use of a facility by the charterer. The claim for unpaid rent was not a valid maritime claim under s 4(3)(m) of the Act.

The priority berthing licence fees, however, did constitute a valid general maritime claim under s 4(3)(m). The licence was a necessary service for a ship like the Bass Reefer that ran regular and scheduled voyages. It was supplied to the Bass Reefer, as the only ship conducting that run, in a reasonably direct way, and was not merely for the charterer's use. The licence was 'personal' to the ship.

The Court dismissed the argument that claims for rental or licence fees were maritime claims under s 4(3)(p), which concerns tolls, charges and dues in respect of a ship. The claim for rent in respect of the leased land and the terminal lacked a sufficiently direct connection with the Bass Reefer for that argument to stand. Nor could the argument that the licence fees fell under s 4(3)(p) be made out.

The writ in rem ultimately remained valid and was upheld.