Criminal proceedings were brought against the respondents, 35 crew members on board the US vessel MV Seaman Guard Ohio, for illegally carrying a large cache of arms on the vessel and entering Indian waters without the relevant permits. The Madras High Court (CM195) found no prima facie case made out on the facts in the charge sheet to prosecute the respondents for offences punishable under the Arms Act 1959, and the charge sheet was quashed to that extent. One of the grounds relied by the High Court was that the vessel was within Indian territorial sea waters out of necessity and thus the respondents' action were saved by the principle of 'innocent passage' contemplated in s 4(1) of the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zone Act 1976, and arts 18.2 and 19 of UNCLOS. The Court referred to the limitations of the Indian court’s territorial jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels under s 4(2) of the Indian Penal Code and set out in Republic of Italy through Ambassador v Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 721. Another ground was that s 45(a) of the Arms Act, which provides that it will not apply to 'arms … on board any … vessel and forming part of the ordinary armament or equipment', will in any event absolve the respondents from prosecution.

The appellant appealed, relying on State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal 1992 supp (1) SCC 335, State of Madhya Pradesh v S B Johari (2000) 2 SCC 57 and Gunwantlal v State of Madhya Pradesh (1972) 2 SCC 194, and argued that the Court could not invoke the revisionary and inherent powers under s 397 and s 482 respectively of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to quash the charge sheet at the threshold. The issues here required a full trial on its merits and it should be afforded an opportunity to prove its case.

Held: Appeal allowed, order set aside, and trial Court seized of the matter directed to proceed with the case and decide it on the merits according to law.

The factual reasons provided by the High Court could not support the invoking of its inherent jurisdiction. They had nothing to do with the Court's jurisdiction while entertaining the charge sheet. The huge quantity of arms recovered from the respondents' possession from the vessel and their inability to satisfy legal possession over such arms through adducing licenses or certificates was sufficient to attract the Act's provisions.

The High Court had no jurisdiction to review the materials produced like an appellate Court while hearing the petition under the Code. None of the questions raised were capable of being answered by a mere reading of the first information report, final report and charge sheet, for the first time by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction without the aid of evidence adduced by the parties at trial.

Further, the question with respect to s 45(a) of the Arms Act 1959 is one of fact and the respondents had to prove compliance thereto before they were exempted from the operation of the Act. The section cannot be construed to enable every vessel to carry arms regardless of its purpose, necessity and requirement to carry them on board. The same applied to the issue of compliance with the provisions of UNCLOS. All these issues, being purely factual issues, could only be gone into in an inquiry made by the trial Court on evidence in accordance with law.

[See also Dudnik v Inspector of Police (CMI1478).]