In September 1988 a cargo of soya bean oil owned by various cargo owners (the respondents) was carried in bulk aboard the Tatry, owned by Zegluga Polska Spolka Alceyjna (the appellants), on a voyage from Brazil to Rotterdam for part of the cargo and to Hamburg for the rest. The cargo was allegedly contaminated with diesel or other hydrocarbons during the course of the voyage. The appellants and the respondents commenced actions in the courts of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The cargo owners for the carriage from Brazil to Rotterdam consisted of Phillip Brothers Ltd (Phillip) (referred to as Group 2) and a group of owners of cargo carried to Rotterdam under separate bills of lading (Group 1). The cargo owners for the Rotterdam to Hamburg carriage consisted of a group of four owners of cargo carried to Hamburg under four separate bills of lading, namely Phillip, Bunge & Co Ltd (Bunge), Hobum Oele & Fette AG (Hobum) and Handelsgesellschaft Kurt Nitzer GmbH (Nitzer) (Group 3). The registered offices of Phillip and Bunge were in the United Kingdom. The registered offices of Hobum and Nitzer were in Germany.

On 18 November 1988, the appellants brought an action against Group 1 (under art 2 of the Brussels Convention 1968 as amended (the Brussels Convention)) and Group 3 (except for Phillip) (under art 6.1) in the Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court) in Rotterdam, seeking a declaration that they were not liable or not fully liable for the alleged contamination. This application was made before the commencement of any other proceedings.

Group 3 made an unsuccessful attempt to arrest the Tatry in Hamburg and subsequently commenced an action in rem in the English Admiralty Court against the Tatry and a sister ship, the Maciej Rataj (Folio 2006). In Folio 2006, the appellants applied for the Admiralty Court to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Netherlands court under art 21 of the Brussels Convention relating to lis pendens or, in the alternative, under art 22 on related actions.

Group 2 commenced an action in rem separately against the Maciej Rataj in the Admiralty Court (Folio 2007). In Folio 2007, the appellants requested that the Admiralty Court decline jurisdiction based on art 22. The appellants did not rely on art 21 as the Admiralty Court was the court first seised in this case. The respondents submitted that art 3.3 of the Arrest Convention 1952, which provides that '[a] ship shall not be arrested ... more than once in any one or more of the jurisdictions of any of the Contracting States in respect of the same maritime claim by the same claimant' was a provision on lis pendens.

On 15 September 1989, the writs were served on the Maciej Rataj in Liverpool and the vessel was arrested. The Admiralty Court based its jurisdiction on ss 20-24 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), which implements the Arrest Convention 1952 in the United Kingdom. Both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are parties to the Arrest Convention 1952. The appellants acknowledged service of the writ and provided a guarantee to secure the vessel's release from arrest.

On 18 September 1989, the appellants initiated separate proceedings against Phillip's agents in Rotterdam for a declaration of non-liability for cargo contamination.

On 29 September 1989, Group 1 brought an action for damages in the Netherlands against the appellants. Group 1 did not bring an action before the English courts.

On 29 September 1989 and 3 October 1989, Groups 2 and 3 (except for Phillip) brought actions against the appellants in the Netherlands in the event that the English courts declined jurisdiction.

On 26 October 1990, the appellants initiated proceedings in the Netherlands to limit their liability for the entire cargo (under the International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships 1957).

At first instance, the Admiralty Court decided that: (1) it was under no obligation to decline jurisdiction or stay proceedings under art 21 of the Brussels Convention; (2) Folio 2006, Folio 2007 and the proceedings commenced in the Netherlands were related actions; and (3) proceedings should not be stayed or jurisdiction declined for those two cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, considered that the outcome of the proceedings depended on the interpretation of arts 21, 22 and 57 of the Brussels Convention, decided to stay proceedings, and referred five questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling.

Held: The Court gave its preliminary ruling on the five questions.​

1. On a proper construction, art 57 of the Brussels Convention means that, where a Contracting State is also a contracting party to another Convention on a specific matter containing rules on jurisdiction, that specialised Convention precludes the application of the provisions of the Brussels Convention only in cases governed by the specialised Convention and not in those to which it does not apply.
2. On a proper construction of art 21 of the Brussels Convention, where two actions involve the same cause of action and some but not all of the parties to the second action are the same as the parties to the action commenced earlier in another Contracting State, the second court seised is required to decline jurisdiction only to the extent to which the parties to the proceedings before it are also parties to the action previously commenced; it does not prevent the proceedings from continuing between the other parties.
3. On a proper construction of art 21 of the Brussels Convention, an action seeking to have the defendant held liable for causing loss and ordered to pay damages has the same cause of action and the same object as earlier proceedings brought by that defendant seeking a declaration that he is not liable for that loss.
4. A subsequent action does not cease to have the same cause of action and the same object and to be between the same parties as a previous action where the latter, brought by the owner of a ship before a court of a Contracting State, is an action in personam for a declaration that that owner is not liable for alleged damage to cargo transported by its ship, whereas the subsequent action has been brought by the owner of the cargo before a court of another Contracting State by way of an action in rem concerning an arrested ship, and has subsequently continued both in rem and in personam, or solely in personam, according to the distinctions drawn by the national law of that other Contracting State.
5. On a proper construction of art 22 of the Brussels Convention, it is sufficient, in order to establish the necessary relationship between, on the one hand, an action brought in a Contracting State by one group of cargo owners against a shipowner seeking damages for harm caused to part of the cargo carried in bulk under separate but identical contracts, and, on the other, an action in damages brought in another Contracting State against the same shipowner by the owners of another part of the cargo shipped under the same conditions and under contracts which are separate from but identical to those between the first group and the shipowner, that separate trial and judgment would involve the risk of conflicting decisions, without necessarily involving the risk of giving rise to mutually exclusive legal consequences.

The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the Arrest Convention 1952 contains provisions relating to lis pendens in art 3.3. Where an arrest has already been made in the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, art 3.3 of the Arrest Convention prohibits a second arrest by the same claimant in respect of the same claim in the jurisdiction, in particular, of another Contracting State. Such a prohibition has nothing to do with the concept of lis pendens within the meaning of art 21 of the Brussels Convention. The latter provision is concerned with the situation where proceedings are brought before two courts, both of which have jurisdiction, and it governs only the question which of those two courts is to decline jurisdiction in the case.