The United States Coast Guard discovered cocaine on a vessel bearing no indicia of nationality in the Dominican Republic's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The crew asserted that the vessel was of Colombian nationality. Columbia, however, was unable to confirm or deny registry of the vessel, which rendered the vessel a 'vessel without nationality' and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under s 70502(d)(1)(c) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).

The crew were arrested, brought to the United States, and indicted. The indictment alleged that the conduct occurred 'upon the high seas'.

The crew jointly moved to dismiss the indictment on several grounds. They argued, among other things, that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to them because they were arrested in the EEZ, which is not part of the 'high seas,' as defined by customary international law. Therefore, their conduct fell outside of Congress's authority under art I, s 8, cl 10 of the Constitution (the Felonies Clause), and the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The Government opposed the motion, arguing that although a coastal nation has special economic rights in the EEZ adjacent to its territorial waters, the EEZ is still part of the 'high seas' within the meaning of the Felonies Clause.

The District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA. The District Court explained that courts have recognised that a nation's territorial waters extend up to 12 nm from the coast, and that the waters seaward of the territorial sea are the 'high seas'. The Court noted that the crew cited no case where a Court had held that the EEZ was not part of the 'high seas'. The crew subsequently each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kg or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

The crew appealed their convictions. They contended that under customary international law, the EEZ is not part of the 'high seas' based on the UNCLOS definition of the EEZ and its related section pertaining to 'high seas', as well as the definition of an EEZ in the Code of Federal Regulations. They also argued on appeal that Congress exceeded its authority under the Felonies Clause by defining a 'vessel without nationality' under the MDLEA to include vessels where registry is asserted but cannot be confirmed or denied by the foreign country. They maintained that under customary international law, a verbal claim of nationality is prima facie proof of the vessel's nationality, and that the MDLEA improperly displaces that proof without any affirmative evidence to the contrary.

Held: Appeal rejected and the appellants' convictions affirmed.

The Felonies Clause bestows on Congress the power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. However, Congress lacks the power to proscribe drug trafficking in the territorial waters of another State.

The question is whether the EEZ is part of the 'high seas' for the purpose of the Felonies Clause. Thus, the appeal turns on the meaning of the term 'high seas' within the Felonies Clause. The scope of Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is informed by the meaning of 'high seas' when the framers adopted the Constitution.

When the Constitution was adopted, there were two divisions of the sea, territorial waters of nations and the 'high seas', the latter of which fell outside of national sovereignty. Special carve-out zones, such as the EEZ, did not exist.

The first official international recognition of the EEZ appears in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), which defines the EEZ under arts 55 and 57:

Article 55: Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone

The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.

Article 57: Breadth of the exclusive economic zone

The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

As the United States has made clear, the EEZ is a unique creation with limited features. It is a maritime area in which the coastal State may exercise certain limited powers as recognised under international law. The EEZ is not the same as the concept of the territorial seas, and is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any coastal State. According to art 56 of the UNCLOS, within each coastal State's respective EEZ, coastal States have only limited sovereign economic-related rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the natural resources, both living and non-living.

The subsequent modern recognition of the EEZ in the 20th century has no bearing on the original meaning of 'high seas' in the Felonies Clause. Accordingly, as a matter of first impression, the EEZ is part of the 'high seas' for the purpose of the Felonies Clause. Therefore, enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZ is proper, and the District Court properly denied the appellants' motion to dismiss the indictment.

In respect of the appellants' constitutional challenge to the MDLEA's definition of a vessel without nationality, the Court explained that under international law, as defined by multilateral international treaties entered into by the United States, including the Convention on the High Seas 1958, vessels on the 'high seas' are typically subject to the criminal jurisdiction only of their nation of registry. However, stateless vessels, such as the appellants', are 'international pariahs' that have no internationally recognised right to navigate freely on the high seas.