The plaintiff claimed PTE 678,426 from the defendant carrier for short shipment of bags of polyvinyl chloride resin from Salvador, Brazil, to Leixões, Portugal. The court of first instance held that the plaintiff's claim was extinguished. The plaintiff appealed.

Held: Appeal dismissed; judgment under appeal confirmed.

Carriage of goods by sea is governed by the Hague Rules which have been implemented in Portuguese domestic law. Pursuant to art 3.6 of this Convention, the period for exercising the right to compensation for loss or deterioration of goods transported by sea shall be one year from the date of delivery to their destination or from the date on which they were to be delivered. Accordingly, since the goods covered by the present contract from Brazil were landed at the port of their destination (Leixões) on 20 and 21 February 1991, it was from that date one must count the deadline referred to in art 3.6 of that Convention. It was within that period that the owner of the goods had to bring an action for damages for the damage suffered by the goods during transport. But the action was not brought until 24 April 1992 and was therefore outside the one-year period.

However, the plaintiff submits that the period of limitation, in the present case, is not that provided for in art 3.6 of the Brussels Convention, but art 27.2 of Decree Law No 352/86, of 21 October, which establishes, for the expiry of the rights of indemnity provided for in that law, a period of two years from the date on which the injured party had knowledge of its rights. But, with due respect, this is not correct. Article 2 of Decree Law No 352/86 provides that 'this contract is governed by the international treaties and conventions in force in Portugal and, in the alternative, by the provisions of this statute'. The expiry period provided for in art 27 of that Decree Law therefore applies only to situations not provided for in the Hague Rules, and in particular to carriage of goods on deck, which is not governed by this Convention.

The plaintiff objects that art 3.6 of the aforementioned Convention only speaks of the liability of the shipowner and the ship, so that it does not apply to the carrier. Again, this is incorrect. As is well explained in the judgment appealed, citing Mario Raposo in Maritime Law - A Perspective [In Review of the Bar Association, No 43, May, 1983, p 354 n 15], according to art 2 of the Brussels Convention, loading and unloading is the responsibility of the carrier and not the shipowner, since the official text of the Convention uses the expression 'transporteur'. Moreover, it is settled in case law of the Supreme Court of Justice that the expiry referred to in art 3.6 of the Hague Rules also benefits the carrier.

The plaintiff further submits that, at the time it brought the action, its right to obtain reimbursement from the defendant was not yet expired, as the defendant had expressly agreed to extend the expiry period by three months. Therefore the plaintiff was able to bring the action in good time by 11 May 1992. It is true that, in the present case, the carrier claimed to grant the plaintiff an extension of three months. It is also true that it did so subject to the following terms and conditions: 'Despite what is said and entirely without prejudice to our rights, we have granted 3 months of extension of the expiry period until 11/05/92, provided that you are duly subrogated in the rights of the insured and, also, provided that you obtain equal extension of the shipowner of the ship'. Since the declaration of extension of the time limit, subject to those conditions, is of a suspensive nature, it would become fully effective only if those conditions were verified, and proof of their verification was the responsibility of the party who wished to take advantage of the effectiveness of that declaration. Since the plaintiff has not adduced such proof, it cannot benefit from the extension of the expiry period contained in the declaration.

Finally, the plaintiff submits that the defendant was obliged to transport the goods to S João Madeira, and therefore not only by sea but also by land, which is why, it states, the time limit set in art 3.6 of the Brussels Convention is inapplicable, as it applies only to carriage of goods by sea. It seems clear to us that this argument is unsustainable. It was the plaintiff itself who argued that the defendant 'assumed the obligation to transport, by itself and by a third party, at the request and on behalf of Petro Company ... , 600 (six hundred) tons of Norvic SR 1,100 PVC resin, packed in bags from Salvador to Leixões'. This, moreover, is confirmed by the bill of lading.