This case involved the carriage by sea of a pleasure craft from Lisbon, Portugal, to Luanda, Angola. The owner of the pleasure craft intended to sell it to an Angolan buyer. A charterparty was entered into in respect of the vessel that would carry the pleasure craft to its destination. A dispute as to freight arose and the pleasure craft was arrested. The owner of the pleasure craft sought unsuccessfully to have the arrest decree set aside, and appealed to the Lisbon Court of Appeal.

Held: Appeal granted. Decision ordering the seizure of the pleasure craft set aside and arrest decree lifted.

In this case, the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules on the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, signed in Brussels in 1952 (the Arrest Convention 1952), approved for ratification by Decree-Law 41007 of 16/02/1957, must be examined. Article 1.1.e of the Arrest Convention 1952 includes as a maritime claim a claim arising out of an 'agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship whether by charterparty or otherwise'. According to art 5 of Decree-Law 191/87 of 4/29, 'a charter contract for voyage is one in which the charterer is obliged to make available to the charterer of a ship, or part thereof, use on one or more preset journeys for the carriage of specified goods'. On the other hand, art 1 of Decree-Law 352/86 of 21/10 stipulates that 'a contract of carriage of goods by sea is one in which one of the parties undertakes in relation to the other to transport certain goods from one port to another. different port, by means of a pecuniary remuneration, called "freight"'. The real distinction between a sea freight contract and a charter contract is that the former relates to cargo and the latter to a ship. In such contracts the Arrest Convention 1952 must apply.

It is apparent from the Arrest Convention that, in the case of a maritime claim, the seizure must be declared, provided that such a claim exists, without the need to raise the fear of loss of security. This fear is assumed given the ease of movement of vessels and the speed with which a change of flag can be carried out. Accordingly, it will only be necessary to ascertain whether or not there is the 'appearance of the right' of claim invoked by the arresting party. What is certain is that it is not necessary for the legal right to be fully established, but only that there is a mere 'fumus boni juris', that is, that the right presents itself as credible. In the light of the foregoing facts, there is a reasonable possibility that there was a credit relationship between the applicant and the defendant.

However, from the Arrest Convention 1952 it appears that only the vessel carrying out the transport can be seized (see the wording of arts 2 and 3 of the same). No reference is made in the articles of the Convention to the seizure of the goods carried on the ship, which is why we believe that it is not possible to invoke the Convention in order to seize the goods. From the facts set out above, it appears that the pleasure craft was not, of course, the vessel undertaking transportation, but the goods themselves to be transported. Therefore, the seizure could not be enacted on the basis of the Arrest Convention 1952.