This case concerned both criminal and civil liability arising out of a collision between fishing vessels. The Court of first instance found against the appellants, Argali Investments Ltd and Hiscox Syndicates Ltd, and ordered them to pay compensation to the respondents, Compañía Trasmediterránea SA and Mapfre Empresas SA. The appellants appealed the decision to the Provincial Court.

Held: Appeal dismissed. The decision of the Court of first instance is largely confirmed, apart from a ruling on the default interest to be paid on the compensation.

In considering the civil liability derived from damage caused by a collision, the Court noted that this is based on the same principles set forth in the Civil Code that govern extra-contractual liability. The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules on Collisions 1910 (the Collision Convention 1910), ratified by Spain on 17 November 1923, establishes a regime that is similar to that of extra-contractual liability and is based on fault (art 3), so that there will be no liability if the collision is fortuitous or brought about by a cause that cannot be specified (art 2). Therefore, this liability regime is based on fault, without it being presumed (art 6). In the case of common fault, the responsibility of each of the vessels will be proportional to the seriousness of the faults they respectively committed (art 4).

The court also had to consider limitation of liability, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, made in London on 19 November 1976 and amended by the Protocol of 2 May 1996, which came into effect in Spain on 10 April 2005 (LLMC 1996). The issue arises because one of the vessels involved in the collision is a yacht used by its owners for recreational activities. After acknowledging the existence of competing doctrinal opinions, the Court opted for the opinion that excludes such vessels from the application of the LLMC 1996, finding that the limitation of liability regime only applies to vessels that perform a productive activity or that are in operation. The issue was not merely whether or not the yacht was a 'sea-going vessel'. The Court based this conclusion on art 2 of the Convention and on the restrictive interpretation that should be given to any limitation of liability. 

The Court went on to consider conduct barring limitation of liability as set out in art 4 of the LLMC 1996, in order to decide whether it should apply. The Court noted that it should be borne in mind that the CMI wanted to reinforce the right of limitation of liability, making it less vulnerable, and therefore proposed replacing the solution adopted by the Brussels Convention of 1957 (LLMC 1957), which rested on the personal fault of the owner, with direct or eventual intent. The CMI justified this extension of limitation of liability by understanding that this was the condition for a considerable increase in the maximum limits of liability. Therefore, there will be a right to limit liability as long as insurance coverage is not lost, establishing in this way a parallel between the fault that implies the loss of limitation and the loss of insurance. It should be noted finally that this formula of the CMI was also included in other international Conventions in the drafting of which the CMI intervened, as in art 7 of the International Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Carriage of Passengers by Sea, signed in Brussels on 29 April 1961 (Carriage of Passengers Convention 1961), as well as in art 7 of the International Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Carriage of Passenger Luggage by Sea, signed in Brussels on 27 May 1967 (Luggage Convention 1967).

Applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the Court concluded that the action of the captain of the yacht did not have the characteristics or meet the necessary requirements set forth in art 4 of the LLMC 1996 to bar limitation of liability, because this was not a case of direct or eventual intent, but of serious fault, necessary for the crime of damage due to imprudence in art 567 of the Penal Code, but insufficient to meet the criteria of art 4 of the Convention. The latter refers to fraudulent behavior, even if carried out in an eventual manner, but it does not extend to guilty parties, even when there is conscious fault, because this can not be identified with eventual fraud, which is what the aforementioned provision refers to.