The appellant, a Nigerian forwarding and clearing agent, claimed in the Federal High Court of Lagos against the first respondent for failure to deliver a Toyota LiteAce bus carried from Antwerp to Lagos.​ In the course of the proceedings, the appellant sought the joinder of the owners of MV 'Republica di Genova' as the second respondent and to effect service on the owners by substituted service through the first respondent, as the agent in Nigeria of the owners of the vessel. These applications were granted by the Federal High Court in Lagos.

By motion on notice the second respondent, without filing a statement of defence, sought and was granted an order dismissing the action against it so far as it related to it, on the grounds that the appellant's cause of action was statute-barred based on art 3.6 of the Hague Rules incorporated into the bill of lading on which the appellant based his claim and/or based on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1958 (Laws of Nigeria). The trial Judge further held that the claim against the first respondent should be dismissed in limine on the ground that the appellant had sued the first respondent as the agent of a known and disclosed principal. Therefore, on the elementary principles of law of agency as established in numerous judicial decisions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal the agent incurred no liability in such circumstances either in contract or in tort.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial Judge erred in law in holding that the claim was statute-barred against the second respondent as at 9 May 1991 when the order joining the second respondent was made, whereas the substantive claim was filed in time and the statement of claim already filed clearly referred to the vessel as being responsible for the non-delivery of the bus; and that the trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the appellant's claim against the second respondent on technicalities when the justice of the case demanded trial on the merits.

Held: Appeal dismissed; ruling of the Federal High Court confirmed.

The claim for the loss or damage for non-delivery of the bus arose or accrued on 6 December 1989. To maintain a valid action against the second respondent, the action must have been instituted on or before 7 December 1990. As the action against the second respondent was outside this period, the appellant was caught under the period of limitation under art 3.6 of the Schedule to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Cap 44, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, which implements the Hague Rules in Nigeria. The appellant did not apply for an extension of the period of limitation to sue the second respondent. By virtue of art 3.6, both the second respondent carrier and/or its agent were discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage because the suit or action was not brought within one year. The trial Judge came to the right decision that the joinder of the second respondent was improper, having been joined after the period of limitation of one year as specified in art 3.6.