This was an appeal from Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corp v Seres Shipping Inc (CMI842). The appellant filed four claims for compensation for damage sustained to its vessels in collisions with the respondents' vessels. The Court below held that all four claims were time-barred. The appellant appealed.

Held: Appeals dismissed.

In the instant case it is not clear why the appellant was waiting to bring the action even though the period of limitation was known to it and why it was allowed to run out. Not only was the period of limitation allowed to run out, the bank guarantee was also allowed to expire, though the original period of the guarantee was extended up to 24 March 1978. It appears that there was no agreement between the parties that the respondents would be bound to satisfy the claims outside the period of limitation.

The Court below was rightly dismayed at the callous indifference of the appellant in not bringing an action within time and at its futile attempt to persuade the respondents to meet its claims through letters and personal persuasion. The Court also noted with surprise that the appellant did not even make any application before it for granting an extension of time beyond two years and that it did not take advantage of the opportunity to file such an application during the hearing of the suit which extended beyond a day.

Counsel for the appellant could not advance any new grounds for condoning the lapses in bringing an action within the period of limitation nor could he given us any reason why the respondents should be deprived of their legal right based thereon. His attempt to get any interpretation of s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 [which gives effect to art 7 of the Collision Convention 1910 in Bangladesh] which will be favourable to the appellant must fail for the simple reason that the words used therein are very clear. It says that no action to enforce any claim is maintainable unless proceedings therein are commenced within two years from the date when the damage or loss was caused. His reference to the words used in the proviso is also of no avail because it confers power on the Court to extend the two-year period of limitation in accordance with Rules of Government to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit. There are no Rules of Government covering the present case. Apart from the absence of any necessity to extend the time beyond the period of limitation, there has been no application before the Court explaining the reason for its inability to do so. So far as the need for giving reasonable opportunity of arresting the respondents' vessel within the jurisdiction of the Court was concerned, no such question arose in the present case which necessitates the extension of time.