This was an application brought by the appellant against the respondent in the District Court for personal injury incurred on board a passenger or reef boat named the Shark on a sightseeing voyage in the Bay of Famagusta. The respondent argued that the appellant's claims were time-barred, and that the District Court did not have jurisdiction as the appellant's claims 'were based on an accident at sea and/or during the voyage and/or management of a vessel'. The respondent contended that the competent Court was the Supreme Court.

The President of the District Court held that the vessel in which the appellant was carried was a 'ship' within the meaning of the law, and that her claim for bodily harm thus fell within the provisions of s 1(1)(f) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK), as applicable in Cyprus. The appellant's claim therefore came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Courts of Justice Law 1960 (Law 14/60): see CMI1635. The appellant appealed this dismissal of jurisdiction.

Held: Appeal allowed.

The appellant insisted that this was a reef boat without a keel (and therefore not a ship within the meaning of the law), and that it 'did not travel by sea as defined by the law'. The respondent did not seem to dispute that the boat in question was used in the reefs. It was its position that this was a ship, but without referring the Court to indisputable facts that supported this position. It should be mentioned that before the President no details were ever given regarding this issue. The claim report did not record anything in relation to the length, width, and capacity of the vessel in question, nor was there any reference to its construction purposes and whether it had autonomous navigation. The respondent did not even touch on such issues in its petition. Not all boats are ships within the meaning of the law, something that the learned President rightly notes in his decision. Thus, in the case of Steedman v Scofield [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 163, it has been said that a jetski while capable of moving on water at high speed, is not intended to move from one place to another, and is therefore not a vessel used in navigation, ie a ship. As was noted: 'it might be possible to navigate a jet ski but it was not a vessel used in navigation'.

In order for the President to be able to decide the issue of jurisdiction for a preliminary ruling, he must first have before him as an indisputable or admissible fact that the vessel was a ship within the meaning of the law. The first instance decision dismissing the lawsuit, including the order for costs, is thus set aside. The proceedings are revived. The Registry is to bring the lawsuit for trial before a competent Judge of the Larnaca-Famagusta District Court. None of the above should be construed as containing a position as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Consequently, it remains open as to whether a reef boat constitutes a vessel used in navigation.