The appellant appealed against a judgment of a single Judge of the Court under the admiralty jurisdiction holding that the claim of the second respondent, the Karachi Port Authority (the KPA), enjoyed preference over the appellant's claim.

The appellant contended that the dues of the KPA did not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court under s 3 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance 1980. The appellant further argued that the KPA should have invoked the provisions of the Port Qasim Authority Act 1973 to detain or attach the vessel, and could not exercise or seek recovery of its port dues under the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

Section 3(2)(m) of the Ordinance provides that the Court has admiralty jurisdiction over 'any claim in respect of the construction, repair or equipment of a ship or dock charges or dues'. The appellant's case appears to be that the KPA's claim could not have been adjudicated or entertained by this Court under its admiralty jurisdiction, but could have been decided only under its original civil jurisdiction. The appellant contended that s 3(2)(m) does not cover port charges, but is only in respect of dock charges, and further that the claim should be only in respect of any equipment which has been brought for construction or repair of a ship and not in respect of ships which are normally berthed or anchored within the port area. However, on a plain reading of the provision, the Court is not inclined to agree with this contention. Section 3(2)(m) covers the KPA's claim in respect of the berthing of ship and provision of other facilities. Here the word 'or' in between ship and dock charges is to be read disjunctively rather than conjunctively, as suggested on behalf of the appellant.

In so far as the use of the words 'dock charges' is concerned, the definition provision in the Ordinance provides that 'port' means any port, harbour, river, estuary, haven, dock etc, whereas the definition of 'charges' includes all charges in respect of light dues, local light dues, or any other charges in respect of lighthouses, buoys, beacons. or pilotage. The KPA's claim in respect of the port dues thus falls within the admiralty jurisdiction, as rightly held by the single Judge.

Since the vessel was already under arrest, there was no need for the KPA to invoke the provisions of the Port Qasim Act 1973 for recovery of its dues and port charges. Once the vessel was arrested, the KPA was neither required, nor it would have been appropriate, to detain the vessel or invoke the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court.

The appellant has failed to demonstrate any error in the judgment of the single Judge.