On 7 October 1989, the MV Nordfels stranded in Callo Roncador, off the coast of Colombia. Cross Caribbean Services Ltd (the plaintiff) became involved in salvage activities for the stranded vessel and its cargo. The plaintiff filed an action in rem for salvage against the cargo on board the stranded vessel. The claim for remuneration for the salvage was USD 850,000, which represented 58.94 per cent of the value of the salved cargo. The Maritime Court applied the provisions related to salvage contained in arts 1490-1501 of the Code of Commerce (the CCom), which mirror arts 1-11 and 14 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea 1910 (the Salvage Convention 1910).
The Court analysed art 1497 of the CCom (art 8 of the Salvage Convention 1910) which states the aspects that a judge must consider when determining the amount of remuneration for salvage. The Court considered that the order of the elements that appear in that provision is an order of relevance or priority, which means that those factors listed first are more important than subsequent factors. Therefore, the Court stated that the value of the property salved is an important element but is one of the less important of the 6 aspects contained in that rule. Hence, the Court ordered the cargo interests to pay the amount of USD 143,230, which corresponded to 10 per cent of the value of the cargo. The plaintiff appealed the decision.
Held: The Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), acting as Court of Maritime Appeals, affirmed the decision. The SCJ noted that, although the lower court understood that there is an order of importance or priority of the aspects that the judge must examine to determine the amount of remuneration, such reasoning did not affect the result of the decision. The SCJ stated that the aspects listed in paras (a) and (b) of art 1497 of the CCom are different and operate and weigh differently in the assessment to determine the amount of remuneration for salvage. The order in which they are applied seems not to have any practical consequences. They are elements that concur without excluding each other. The value of the salved property constitutes, in any case, a limit of the amount of the award to be granted, which cannot exceed the value of the salved cargo (art 1491 CCom, art 2 of the Salvage Convention 1910). Such value had been considered in the decision and the lower court concluded that, according to the case law, remuneration has rarely been fixed at higher than 20 per cent of the value of high-valued property.