This case arose from a pollution incident in the Loire estuary in 2006 caused by a collision between two LPG tankers, the Sigmagas and the Happy Bride, owned by Sigmagas Shipping and Highland Shipping respectively. The Regional Committee for Maritime Fisheries and Marine Farming of the Pays de la Loire (CRPMEM) and 119 professional fishers (the appellants) sued the shipowners and the liquidator of the limitation fund for compensation for their operational losses.

On 22 January 2019, the Rennes Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Court of first instance and rejected the applicants' claim against Sigmagas Shipping. The Court of Appeal held that the appellants' claim for compensation for pollution was based on art 4 of the CLC 1969, as given effect by the Decree of 7 August 1996, which provides that '[w]hen oil has escaped or has been discharged from two or more ships, and pollution damage results therefrom, the owners of all the ships concerned, unless exonerated under Article III, shall be jointly and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable'. The accident investigation report showed that the bow of the Sigmagas struck the starboard forward section of the Happy Bride, and that this was the source of the pollution, with the hold of the Happy Bride leaking heavy fuel oil. Pursuant to art 4 of the CLC 1969, the appellants were in principle entitled to seek compensation from the owners of both the Sigmagas and the Happy Bride. However, it was up to the appellants to establish the damage resulting from the pollution incident. Regarding their operating losses, the only evidence of costs came from the interested parties themselves, from statements collected by the gendarmerie, from certificates from the Turballais group of artisanal fishers, or from a chartered accountant with no technical skills in fishing. No analysis was produced, and there was no finding to confirm that the oil pollution prevented glass eel fishing for a period of 12 days, nor that it was impossible for the fishers to practise their activity in another estuary area. Moreover, as noted by the Court of first instance, no prefectural decree was published prohibiting fishing in the relevant sector. Likewise, the photographs submitted in the proceedings were insufficient to support the claim that the 119 fishers suffered a deterioration of their sieves, all the more so since the interested parties maintained at the same time that they were not able to carry out any fishing at all. The Court of first instance rightly held that the alleged losses had not sufficiently been proven. For the same factual reasons, the demand for compensation by CRPMEM was rightly dismissed by the first instance Judges.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Cassation.

The appellants argued, among other things, that the Court of Appeal had erred in holding that, in the event of oil pollution, the CLC 1992 channels any action against the owner of the ship from which the oil at the origin of the pollution has escaped, in this case the Happy Bride. The Court further erred in finding that fishing was never prohibited, and that the appellants were the source of their own loss, and had provided no justification for their alleged operating losses. The pollution of a fishing area by hydrocarbons necessarily causes prejudice to professional fishers when it constitutes their usual fishing area. The mere fact that the fishing zone was polluted necessarily hampered fishing activity in the polluted zone, notwithstanding the absence of an administrative ban on fishing. The Court of Appeal ruled on an improper basis to exclude the liability of the owner of the ship causing the pollution, depriving its decision of a legal basis with regard to art 3 of the CLC 1969, as amended by the Protocol of 27 November 1992. The fact that it was not established that it was impossible for the fishers to practise their activity of glass eel fishing in another area of the estuary was irrelevant. The fishers were not required to minimise their losses in the interest of the owner of the vessel responsible for the pollution by changing from their usual fishing zone affected by the pollution. Finally, the Court had an obligation not to distort the written evidence provided to it, namely that 'the whole of the eel fishing fleet, fishing in this part of the estuary, remained at the quay, from the day of the incident, 4 January 2006, and for 12 days afterwards'.

Held: Partial cassation.

On the final ground of cassation, the appellants argue that the Court of Appeal judgment distorts the documentary evidence that they submitted to the Court regarding the loss of fishing and the pollution clogging their fishing sieves. The judgment finds that the photographs provided are insufficient to support the claim that the 119 fishers suffered a deterioration of their sieves, especially since the interested parties maintain at the same time that they were not able to carry out any fishing at all. In their submissions, CRPMEM and the relevant fishing professionals maintained: not that they had not been able to carry out any fishing, as held by the judgment; but, on the contrary, that they had 'caught the tides', but that, because the pollution was blocking their sieves, fishing was not possible under admissible conditions. The Court of Appeal, which distorted the clear and precise terms of these submissions, violated the above principle.

The Court of Appeal judgment is therefore struck down and reversed, but only in that it finds that fishing was never prohibited, and that CRPMEM and the 119 fishers are the authors of their own misfortune; finds that the appellants provide no justification of their alleged operating losses; finds that their action against the company Sigmagas Shipping, the company Highland Shipping, and the other defendants, is ill-founded; rejects all their claims, arguments, and submissions; and orders the return of the letter of guarantee on first demand issued on 6 February 2006 by Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. On these points, the judgment is reversed, the case and the parties are placed in the state they were in before this judgment, and the matter is remitted to the Poitiers Court of Appeal.