The plaintiff applied for a renewal of its writ in rem for a period of six months from 7 June 1990.

Held: Application dismissed.

The renewal of the writ is not the plaintiff's right. The Court has a discretion to order, or refuse, renewal of the writ. The Court has to be satisfied that reasonable efforts were made to serve on the defendant. An action was registered on 8 June 1989 against two defendants, the Pan Arab Shipping Co and the ship Ibn Sina. No renewal of the writ was requested regarding the defendant ship. At the request of the plaintiff, the Court granted permission to serve on the notary, with a prepaid duplicate letter to the defendant, at the address 13 Salah Salem Street, Alexandria, Egypt.

On 17 October 1989, the plaintiff and/or their lawyer sent notice of the writ. This application for renewal was filed on 6 June 1990, on the eve of the expiration of twelve months from the date of issue of the notary.

The plaintiff did not take any action and did not make any effort from 17 October 1989 until the beginning of June 1990 to serve the writ on the defendant. The plaintiff has not satisfied the Court that it made reasonable efforts to serve on the defendant. For eight consecutive months it showed no interest.

The plaintiff's lawyer argued that the basis of the action was statute-barred one year from June 1988, and that, if the writ was not renewed, the plaintiff would be left without a remedy, because obviously the defendant would have a full defence based on the statute of limitations. This submission is based on art 3.6 of the Schedule of the Law on the Transport of Goods by Sea, Chapter 263, which states: 'In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.' This Act, enacted on 4 February 1927, with the Schedule, introduced into Cypriot law the provisions of the Hague Rules. The above provision of art 3.6 has been amended by the Hague-Visby Rules.

These provisions, that are contained in our own law, and the Hague-Visby Rules, that are incorporated into English law by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (UK), were examined in Cia Portorafti SA v Ultramar Panama Inc [1989] 2 All ER 54. In this case it was decided that the provisions of art 3 of the Hague Rules apply only to those obligations referred to in art 2, which provides: 'Subject to the provisions of article VI, under every contract of carriage of goods by sea the carrier, in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities, and entitled to the rights and immunities hereinafter set forth.'

Reading art 2 in connection with the definition of the phrase 'carriage of goods' in art 1.e, this limits the application of art 3 to operations beginning with the loading and ending with the discharge of the cargo and covers the intermediate stages.

In Cia Portorafti SA v Ultramar Panama Inc the Judge held that '[o]nce the conclusion is reached that delivery is outside the scope of art II, which is of course the key article, it must inexorably follow that misdelivery of whatever kind is outside the scope of art III, para 6, since the carrier is under no "liability" in that respect. There is, moreover, in consequence no need for any saving clause comparable to art IV, para 5 (e). In reaching this conclusion as to the correct construction of the relevant articles I have fully borne in mind the need to adopt a broad and purposive approach in construing a convention of this kind. ... Thus I hold as a matter of construction that misdelivery, whether dishonest, honestly intentional or merely mistaken, is entirely outside the scope of the rule.'

The cause of action in the present case is already time-barred. No other evidence was presented to the Court that would incline the scales, in terms of hardship, to the benefit of the plaintiff. No evidence has been put before the Court on the basis of which the Court may exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. In Cyprus Potato Marketing Board v Thetis Shipping Co Pte Ltd (1988) 1 CLR 397, 404 it was stated: 'The plaintiffs are under a duty to pursue their action diligently. If, due to their inaction, the validity of a writ expires, it is not necessarily unjust that the plaintiff should lose his right to proceed.'

The Court is not satisfied that the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to serve on the defendant, or that there is another good reason for renewing the writ.