On 27 January 2012, a fire broke out on the defendants' ships moored at pier B of Alimos marina. Due to the extent of the fire and the fuel spillage, marine pollution was created in the wider area of the port facilities of the marina which extended over an area of approximately 24,000 m².

Etaireia Akiniton Dimosiou Anonymi Etaireia (ET A D AE) (Public Real Estate Company Societe Anonyme (ET A D SA)), the marina manager and operator, assigned to the claimant the obligation to conduct works for the protection of the marine environment and limitation and treatment of pollution. It paid the claimant part of its remuneration for the clean-up work when it was completed, as agreed. The claimant requested that the defendants be ordered to pay the remaining costs (fees and expenses) of cleaning up the marina.

The Court of First Instance accepted the claim against one of the defendants. The claimant appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal annulled it and ordered the shipowners/defendants to pay costs to the claimant.

Two of the defendants appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Held: The Decision 716/2017 of the Three Membered Court of Appeal of Piraeus (Maritime Division) is annulled. The case is remitted for further hearing to the same Court of Appeal, which will be composed of judges other than those who issued the annulled decision.

In order to address risks and problems of pollution due to oil carried by sea, the CLC 1969 was signed. Greece ratified this Convention by Law 314/1976. After the ratification of the Protocols of 1976, 1984, and 1992, this convention is named the CLC 1992 (see Supreme Court in Plenary Session Decision 23/2006) (CMI335). This international Convention establishes objective liability of the shipowner for damage caused by sea pollution due to escape or spillage of oil from its ship, since no fault on its part is required to establish liability.

Law 743/1977 establishes the obligations of those responsible for pollution of the marine environment, and in art 12 establishes their specific civil liability for compensation of damage caused by pollution and the costs necessary to prevent or eliminate pollution. This civil liability was not introduced solely in the general interest to safeguard environmental assets but also to protect private rights. It is compensatory in nature, and its purpose is to remedy the damage caused to the marine and coastal environment by pollution, and to compensate for the costs incurred either proactively, to prevent pollution, or reactively, to counteract its harmful effects. As regards its legal nature, that liability is subjective, since it presupposes fault, ie, the fault of a natural person, which is not presumed but must be proved by the injured party. Thus, although the CLC 1992, ratified by Law 314/1976, established objective liability of the injuring party, the above provision establishes subjective liability at the level of national law, which is explained by the wide scope of application of Law 743/1977.

There was no dangerous pollution situation giving rise to an obligation on the part of the appellants to act, as a measure indicated by the circumstances, to place a guard on board the vessel in question, since such an obligation is not imposed by a legal provision, good faith, prevailing social customs, and the general duty of care as normal or reasonable expected behaviour. Therefore, the grounds of appeal are well-founded.

The Court of Appeal accepted the claimant's entitlement to bring the action. The manager and operator of the marina commissioned the claimant to carry out work for the protection of the marine environment, containment, and response to the pollution caused. The claimant accepted this commission and sent anti-pollution vessels and the needed personnel and immediately started providing its services and completed the clean-up works. Therefore '[t]he claimant, as a private company, which provided the necessary means and services for the effective response to the marine pollution incident in question, is entitled ... to its corresponding remuneration and the costs of the clean-up.' The Court of Appeal correctly held that the respondent is actively entitled to bring the action and, therefore, the second ground of the appeal, which alleges direct violation of the provisions of arts 297 and 298 of the Civil Code and arts 11 and 12 of Law 743/1997, is unfounded.