The Andrew J Barberi (the Barberi), a ferry owned by the City of New York (the defendant), allided with a maintenance pier near the Staten Island ferry terminal, killing 11 passengers. The Dorothy J, a tugboat owned and operated by Henry Marine Service Inc (Henry Marine), attempted to assist the Barberi back to the passenger slip where emergency personnel were waiting to help. After this initial period of assistance, the Dorothy J spent the next several days continuously pushing on the Barberi to hold it in position. Henry Marine and the crew members of the Dorothy J (the plaintiffs) filed claims against the defendant, seeking an award for the salvage services performed by the Dorothy J. The plaintiffs argued that the Dorothy J provided the useful result of expediting the Barberi's return to the slip by 16-20 minutes. This contribution saved the Barberi from experiencing additional property damage and prevented greater injury and loss of life.

Two issues arose for the Court. First, were the plaintiffs entitled to a salvage award for the services they provided in the immediate aftermath of the allision? Second, if they were so entitled, what was the appropriate amount of the salvage award and its appropriate distribution between the plaintiffs?

Held: Judgment in favour of the plaintiffs. Quantum and apportionment as below.

Regarding the first issue, art 12.1 of the International Convention on Salvage 1989 (Salvage Convention 1989) provides that '[s]alvage operations which have had a useful result give rise to a reward'. In addition, art 12.2 of the Salvage Convention 1989 provides that 'no payment is due under the Convention if the salvage operations have had no useful result'. A successful salvage claim requires proof of 'success in whole or in part, with the services rendered having contributed to such success'. Effort alone is not enough to justify a salvage award.

In light of the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiffs partially succeeded in rescuing the Barberi from peril, but that success was limited and had little effect on the outcome. Nevertheless, the quality and degree of contributory service need only be slight to justify a salvage award. The extent of the service might affect the amount of the award, but not its validity. Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to a salvage award.

Regarding the second issue, the Court had a discretion to determine the appropriate amount of a salvage award. In determining the amount of the salvage award, the Court considered the following factors: (1) the labour expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service; (2) the promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the property; (3) the value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to which such property was exposed; (4) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril; (5) the value of the property saved; (6) the degree of danger from which the property was rescued; (7) the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimising damage to the environment; (8) the measure of success obtained by the salvor; (9) the availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations; (10) the state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value thereof. Based on the evidence, the Court granted the plaintiffs a salvage award in the amount of USD 75,000.

Regarding the apportionment of the salvage award between the plaintiffs, art 15 of the Salvage Convention 1989 specifies that the 'apportionment of [a salvage award] between the owner, master and other persons in the service of each salvage vessel shall be determined by the law of the flag of that vessel'. Thus, the Court had a discretion to determine the apportionment of a salvage award. The owner of a salving vessel generally receives a greater portion of the total award than its crew because it plays the central role in facilitating the success of a salvage operation. The portion of a salvage award allowed to the salving vessel's crew members is frequently divided among them in proportion to their wages. Accordingly, the award of USD 75,000 was to be apportioned 1/3 to Henry Marine, and 2/3 amongst the crew members. The USD 50,000 apportioned to the crew members was to be divided among the crew members according to the percentage of the total daily wages each position received, with adjustments for exceptional contributions to the operation.

In addition, art 24 of the Salvage Convention 1989 provides that the 'right of the salvor to interest on any payment due under this Convention shall be determined according to the law of the [country] in which the tribunal seized of the case is situated'. Under US federal law, the Court had a discretion in deciding whether to award prejudgment interest. In exercising that discretion, the Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest on the salvage award at the rate prescribed under 28 USC §1961.