This case concerned a collision between the Corstar and the Eurymedon in Long Reach, River Thames, on 6 January 1937.

The Corstar was anchored north of mid-river, displaying proper anchor lights. Despite this, the vessel's position partially obstructed the navigable fairway. The Eurymedon was proceeding upriver at approximately 10 knots. Its crew failed to detect the Corstar's anchor lights in sufficient time and did not adequately reduce speed when navigating an area with confusing shore lights.

Held: Both vessels are found equally to blame for contributory negligence. The Corstar was negligent for anchoring athwart the fairway, while the Eurymedon was negligent for excessive speed and inadequate lookout.

Scott LJ: I venture to add two final observations. The first is that the regime of the proportional rule has freed the Admiralty Court from an undue temptation to shut its eyes to minor degrees of negligence, involving, as was often the case under the half and half rule, an unjust degree of punishment. The second is that the spirit of the proportional rule in my opinion, calls for the sort of wide view of joint responsibility which Lord Birkenhead thought right. Indeed, his Lordship's remark about the proportional rule seems to support what I have just said. Such a view of the proportional rule has a further advantage. I believe it would be consonant with the juridical attitude and practice of other nations who are parties to the Collision Convention to which legislative effect was given in England by our Act of 1911 (the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK)). The object of that Convention was to effect a step towards the international unification of maritime law, and the proportional rule was a most important feature of it. The maintenance of uniformity in the interpretation of a rule of law after its international adoption is just as important as the initial removal of divergence, but never easy to achieve. From my experience of the views of Continental jurists about the proportional rule, I feel sure that the broad view of the proportional rule is their view; and if we maintain it here, we shall help to preserve that international uniformity which was the object of the Collision Convention. I do not of course suggest that we should judicially mould English law by reference to foreign practice; but that we should in a branch of law covered by international Convention preserve uniformity is an obvious advantage, if it is judicially possible.