This case involved carriage of textiles and sundries from Manchester, England, to Monrovia, Liberia. The appellant claimed that it had suffered losses to its goods due to the respondent carrier's negligence and instituted an action of damages by attachment in admiralty against Denco Shipping Lines and the MV Boringia. In their pleadings, the respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the Court and set up several other defences, including that of the statute of limitations. Along with this answer, the respondents simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons of the respondents, and that the action was time-barred. The respondents contended that, by operation of law, the action should have been instituted within one year of the date of delivery or of the date the goods should have been delivered. Instead, the action was instituted after one year and nine months.

The appellant filed its reply and a resistance to the motion to dismiss, contending that the statute of limitations was a plea in bar or an affirmative defence. While conceding that the statute had run prior to its filing of the complaint, the appellant insisted in the resistance that the respondents' plea of the statute was bad, in that it failed to admit as true the facts stated in the complaint and attempted to set up other defences besides that of the statute of limitations.

The trial Judge dismissed the appellant's claim and ruled that, while the controlling statute provides that a party wishing to plea the statute of limitations must admit the truthfulness of the complaint, since the plea of the statute is affirmative, it would be absurd to reach the conclusion that the legislature intended that such a party must admit as true all of the averments of the complaint in its entirety, even though the pleader is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint. The appellant appealed.

Held: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of the trial Court affirmed.

Kpomakpor J (for the majority of the Court): In our view, the question is, did the lawmakers intend that a defendant wishing to avail itself of the plea of the statute of limitations, when the complaint alleges that defendant has breached a contract with the plaintiff and that as a result of that breach plaintiff has sustained a loss, must first admit as true the allegations in the complaint, even though it knows and has evidence that the possible loss to the plaintiff is less? It is obvious that the answer to this question is no.

Our present Civil Procedure Law permits a party to deny all averments which are either unknown to it or which it knows to be untrue. See Civil Procedure Law, Rev Code 1:9.8. Actually, what this Court frowns upon today, relying on the new Civil Procedure Law, is the plea of general denial which both confesses and avoids in the answer or reply. The trial Judge in the instant case was correct when he sustained the respondents' answer and dismissed the complaint under the statute of limitations: Civil Procedure Law, Rev Code 1:9.8(4).

The desire to modernise the forms of pleadings has not been a unique phenomenon to Liberia. In the United States of America, for example, a substantial number of Courts held in the past that pleadings containing inconsistent allegations were defective, at least if they appeared in a single cause of action. Today, in spite of occasional statements indicating that inconsistent allegations are improper, virtually almost all Courts permit inconsistent allegations, whether separately pleaded or not, if they are made in good faith. A number of States specifically have altered their pleading rules to permit inconsistent pleadings.

As far back as 1974, this Court held, citing the Civil Procedure Law, Rev Code 1:9.3(3), that a party may state several defences in one cause of action, provided such defences are asserted in separate counts. Under the modern practice, a denial of an allegation or allegations, in the nature of a denial and avoidance, is quite proper, especially where it is permitted by our statute. This Court has upheld the general principle that a party may assert as many defences as it wishes, provided, however, that they are made and raised in the same action and set out in separate counts or paragraphs.

Azango J (dissenting): The issue of fraud was raised by both parties. As the issues raised were mixed questions of law and facts, the case should have been tried by a jury. And since it is in admiralty the action should not be dismissed, for it is a holding of this Court that when fraud is alleged, a jury must pass upon the evidence in support of the allegations. In admiralty proceedings, pleading in abatement is not allowed. The trial Judge therefore erred in dismissing the action. The majority should have reversed the ruling of the trial Court and remanded the case with instructions that the lower Court resume jurisdiction over the action, since the Judge erred when he entertained the motion to dismiss.

Junius J (dissenting):​ The respondents should not have pleaded the statute of limitations in avoidance of liability and denied that the appellant had a cause of action and at the same time denied the facts relating to their responsibilities as consignees of the goods which they actually received and admitted receiving; and the Judge should not have dismissed the case, especially where fraud was pleaded.