The vessel Skipper I was carrying a cargo of shredded steel scrap owned by the plaintiffs. The vessel sank at some undisclosed location. The plaintiffs, who claimed for the loss of the cargo, issued a writ in rem against the owners of the ship Evpo Agnic, and applied for a warrant to arrest that ship. The application was accompanied by an affidavit stating that the person who was liable in an action in personam when the action arose against the Skipper I was also the beneficial owner in respect of all the shares of the vessel Evpo Agnic when the writ was issued. This claim was made despite the fact that the Skipper I and the Evpo Agnic were owned by separate one-ship companies. The affidavit asserted that if the veil of incorporation was lifted, it would become evident that the shareholders and president/director in each of the companies were the same.

Subsequently, the warrant was issued, and the Evpo Agnic was arrested. In response, the defendants applied to the High Court to set aside the writ and the warrant for arrest. Sheen J ordered the defendants to disclose all documents related to the ownership of the vessels Skipper I and the Evpo Agnic and adjourned the application to set aside the writ and warrant. Leave was granted to appeal.

Held: Appeal allowed, writ and warrant of arrest set aside.

The admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court is defined in ss 20-24 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (the Act). Section 21, which pertains to the power of arrest, replaced Pt I of the Administration of Justice Act 1956. The purpose of the 1956 Act was to align the English law right of arrest in rem with the Arrest Convention 1952. Consequently, if there is a discrepancy between the language of the statutory provision and the corresponding part of the Convention, the statutory provision must be interpreted in accordance with the Convention if it reasonably allows for that interpretation.

The Court referred to art 3 of the Convention and its corresponding provision in ss 21(1)-(4) of the Act, addressing the issue of who qualifies as the 'relevant person' for the purposes of s 21(4)(b). The Court held that the 'relevant person' must be, or potentially be, a person who would be liable in an action in personam and must, at the time, when the cause of action arose, have been the owner or charterer of, or in possession or control of, the ship. In the context of the section and the Convention, the term 'charterer' referred to a demise charterer, and the words 'or in possession or in control of, the ship' referred to a person in the position of a demise charterer, such as a salvor, but not under a demise charter.

Next, the Court examined the meaning of 'owner', and specifically whether it referred to the registered owner, ie the legal owner, or someone with only equitable property in the ship. The Court highlighted three important points. First, it emphasised that a basic rule of construction presumes that different meanings were intended when a statute uses varying terminology in its provisions, particularly within a single subsection. Second, it noted that all maritime nations maintain shipping registers which record the names of the owners. These registries establish the vessel's flag and subject it to the laws of the country, making the vessel part of that country's territory. Consequently, the Court held that considering a registered owner as a nominal owner would contradict this understanding. Third, it pointed out that the Convention clearly treats ownership and registered ownership as synonymous. Therefore, the Court concluded that concerning a registered ship, the term 'owner' in s 21(4)(b) of the Act referred to the 'registered owner'.

The Court found that Skipper Shipping Co SA was the 'relevant person' under s 21. However, it then necessary to establish whether Skipper Shipping Co SA was the beneficial owner of the Evpo Agnic, with respect to all the shares in that ship, or if it was the demise charterer at the time the action was initiated. The Court found that there was no evidence to support this claim. Finally, the Court held that s 21 does not permit, nor is it intended to grant, a plaintiff the right to arrest a ship that is not 'the particular ship' or a sister ship, but rather a ship owned by a sister company of the owners of 'the particular ship'.