This case concerns a point of construction of the Athens Convention, specifically whether the period of limitation in art 16 of the Athens Convention bars the remedy or extinguishes the right.

The underlying facts are as follows. On 26 August 2008, Dr Kathleen Feest sustained serious spinal injury whilst a passenger on board a 9 metre RIB (rigid inflatable boat) called the Celtic Pioneer. Dr Feest and 10 work colleagues were participating in a corporate team building exercise.

At the time of the incident, Dr Feest was employed by the first defendant (SWSHA), but seconded to the second defendant, UKFPO. Since the defendants had organized the boat trip, Dr Feest contended that the injury had occurred in the course of her employment. She launched a personal injury claim on 25 August 2011. A defence was filed by SWSHA in June 2012. At the same time, SWSHA issued a Part 20 claim against Bay Island Voyages, who were the owners of the Celtic Pioneer.

The Part 20 defence filed by Bay Island Voyages in March 2013 asserted, as a preliminary point, that the boat trip was one to which the Athens Convention applied, and in consequence of arts 14 and 16 of the Athens Convention, the claim for contribution was barred because it had not been brought within 2 years from the date on which Dr Feest disembarked.

The Athens Convention was originally enacted into UK law by s 14 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1979. With effect from 1 January 1996, s 14 was repealed, and replaced by s 183 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.

The appellant (SWSHA) argued, first, that English common law has long treated limitation as barring the remedy rather than extinguishing the right, save in limited special cases. Articles 14 and 16 must be construed as through they were part of directly enacted statute law, rather than simply being an international treaty obligation. It is well settled in English law that clear words are required if a time limit is to be construed as prescriptive of the right of action rather than a procedural bar to suit, and the wording of art 16 was not sufficiently clear to have the effect of extinguishing the right of action. This is the view of McGee on Limitation, 6^th ed at para 26-051. Second, arts 14 and 16 of the Athens Convention apply to actions for damages, not to claims for contribution to a liability in damages. The appellant’s contribution claim is not ‘an action under this Convention’. It is a claim for contribution under s1(3) of the Civil Liability Contribution Act 1978.

The respondent (Bay Island Voyages) argued that it was a well established principle that international conventions incorporated into English law by statute are to be construed ‘on broad principles of general acceptation’ and ‘unconstrained by technical rules of English law or by English legal precedent’. The distinction between periods of limitation which extinguish rights and those which merely bar the remedy is peculiar to English law, or at least to Common Law jurisdictions. Civil Law jurisdictions do not recognise this difference because they regard limitation as being concerned with substantive rights. Most of the countries which have acceded to the Athens Convention do not subscribe to the English rule. They would treat art 16 as extinguishing the right rather than just barring the remedy. 

Held: The appellant’s argument that art 16 of the Athens Convention does not deal with contribution claims, would be rejected. Liability under a contribution claim exists only if the contributor can be shown to be liable to the original claimant for the same damage. The Athens Convention applies to all actions for damages against a carrier, however arising.  The Athens Convention was intended to be the exclusive route to establishing liability of a carrier for personal injury to a passenger. The action brought by the appellant for contribution to damages for personal injury to a passenger is sufficient to engage arts 14 and 16 of the Convention.

Further, the respondent’s approach to construction of the Athens Convention would be preferred. The language of the rules should be construed on broad principles of general acceptation. One consequence is that the construction of the wording should not be based upon any principles or assumptions which are peculiar to the common law (such as that limitation provisions are procedural in character and not substantive).

The objective interpretation of the words ‘Any action for damages… shall be time barred after a period of two years’ in art 16 is that no action for damages arising out of personal injury to a passenger can be brought against the carrier after two years have elapsed from the date of disembarkation. This includes an action seeking contribution to such damages.

In consequence, the appeal was dismissed