Forsaurinkktiebolaget Svenska Veritas SA (the plaintiff), an insurance company acting under an assignment of rights, claimed for damage to a cargo of paper pulp carried from Varberg, Sweden, to Barcelona, Spain, on the MV La Cinta. As a consequence of defective stowage, the paper lost its quality and was sold at a lower price. The lawsuit was filed against the carrier and shipowner Empresa Naviera Sevilla SA (Enssa Line) (the defendant).

The defendant appeared in the process and alleged, among other defences, that the claim had elapsed (caducada). The one-year period to bring suit against the carrier expired on 19 July 1979, but the plaintiff filed the lawsuit after that date. The first instance Court admitted this defence and dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal (CA) affirmed the decision. The plaintiff recurred this decision on cassation before the Tribunal Supremo/Supreme Court (SC). The main argument against the lower court's decision was that the one-year period established in art 22 of the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading of 22 December 1949 (LCGS) was a time limitation (prescripción), not a lapsing period (caducidad). Prescripción allows for interruption, while caducidad does not. The LCGS incorporated the Hague Rules into the Spanish legal regime. The parties agreed to submit the claim to conciliation before the expiration of the one-year period. The plaintiff alleged that the conciliation process interrupted the time limitation producing that the lawsuit was filed in due time.

Held: The SC affirmed the CA decision. The SC stated that the case law and doctrine have extensively supported that the one-year period to bring suit established in art 22 of the LCGS is a lapsing period (caducidad). Article 22 orders that to hold the carrier liable for the damages, the interested party must bring suit within one-year from the date of the delivery of the cargo or the date when they should have delivered (art 3.6 of the Hague Rules). This claim did not meet this requirement. Although the parties agreed within that period to a conciliation process, such proceeding lacked the efficacy of interrupting a lapsing period; nor was the conciliation process a legal prerequisite to bring an action under art 22 of the LCGS.