Mr X entrusted the carriage of a speedboat from Toulon (France) to Port-Louis (Mauritius) to Sud Marine. Sud Marine subcontracted the transport to Pol-Asia Shipping, who chartered a slot on the Viktor Kurnatosvskiy from Copenship, which itself had time chartered the vessel from Azov Shipping. Pol-Asia issued a bill of lading designating Mr X as shipper, notify party, and receiver. The speedboat was placed on a cradle manufactured by Port Pin Rolland and was loaded on deck. The cradle slipped, forcing the ship to divert to unload it. Mr X sued Copenship to compensate him for his losses. The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal in its judgment of 15 March 2007 held that his claim was time-barred. Mr X appealed in cassation.

Held: Partial reversal.

In declaring Mr X's claim against Copenship prescribed, the Court of Appeal held that all actions brought against the carrier (the charterer being assimilated to a carrier within the meaning of art 1.a of the Hague-Visby Rules) and the ship, whatever the basis for the claim, contractual or quasi-delictual, relating to compensation for loss resulting from damage to the goods, are subject to the limitation period of one year under art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules. The Court held that the action against an operator who is not a party to the contract of carriage with the shipper is necessarily of a quasi-delictual nature, and that Mr X, who is acting against the Copenship company on the basis of quasi-delictual liability, cannot claim the normal common law prescription period of 10 years.

By so ruling, while Copenship did not appear on the bill of lading and was not a party to the contract of carriage with the shipper, so that the one-year prescription period was not applicable to the action brought against it by Mr X, the Court of Appeal violated the aforementioned provisions.

For these reasons, the judgment is struck down and annulled, but only in that it declared the action of Mr X to be prescribed against Copenship. On this point, the case and the parties are returned to the position in which they were before the aforementioned judgment, and the case is referred back to the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, differently constituted, to be decided correctly.