This appeal arose from a collision between two large laden tankers in the Scheldt river. The vessels involved in the collision were the Miraflores, which was traveling upriver carrying a cargo of crude oil, and the Abadesa, which was bound downriver with a cargo of fuel oil. The collision resulted in a fire outbreak, causing the escape of burning oil covering a significant portion of the river. 

The appellants were the owners of a third tanker called the George Livanos, as well as the owners of the cargo of crude oil on that ship. The George Livanos was following behind the Miraflores. The appellants argue that when the collision occurred, their vessel had to take drastic action to avoid colliding with the other vessels and becoming involved in the fire. Consequently, the George Livanos grounded in the river, sustained damage, and required salvage assistance to be refloated.

The appellants initiated legal action against both the Miraflores and the Abadesa. A second action was brought by the Miraflores against the Abadesa in respect of the collision damage. Both actions were heard together, and the trial Court found that in the action between the Miraflores and the Abadesa, both vessels were liable. The damage was apportioned as one-third to the Miraflores and two-thirds to the Abadesa. In the action brought by the owners of the George Livanos, which is the subject of this appeal, the Court found that the George Livanos was 50% liable and could accordingly only claim 50% from the other vessels.

The appellants contend that Hewson J in the trial Court incorrectly found that the George Livanos was 50% to blame for its grounding. They argue that the George Livanos was completely absent of fault and should therefore be allowed to recover the entirety of its damages from the other two vessels.

Held (by a majority): Appeal allowed.

Willmer LJ (dissenting): Section 1 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK) (the 1911 Act) is applicable. This section states:

Where, by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those vessels, to their cargoes or freight, or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was at fault: Provided that

(a) if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally; and

(b) nothing in this section shall operate so as to render any vessel liable for any loss or damage to which her fault has not contributed

The appellant argued that Hewson J erroneously interpreted s 1 to mean that the negligence of the Miraflores and the Abadesa should be treated 'as one unit' when apportioning the fault among the three vessels. The appellant contended that s 1 of the Act required him to evaluate the degree of fault for each vessel separately.

Willmer LJ found that it was firmly established that when assessing degrees of fault under s 1 of the 1911 Act, one must consider not only the blameworthiness of the conduct in question, but also its causal significance concerning the damage being claimed. Therefore, in cases like the present one, where the damage sued for is a result of previous negligence by another or other vessels, it seems obvious that the more remote that prior negligence is in terms of time or location, the weaker its causal significance becomes until it ultimately vanishes. At that point, proviso (b) to s 1 of the 1911 Act becomes applicable. Willmer LJ also noted that the principles governing the allocation of fault under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK) should be identical to those applicable under s 1 of the 1911 Act.

Hewson J had applied a commonsense approach in his two-step inquiry. The first step involved the Judge assessing the extent to which the collision caused by the negligence of the Miraflores and the Abadesa contributed to the subsequent stranding of the George Livanos. The second inquiry involved distributing the liability for compensating the damage in proportion to the degree of fault of each vessel, as mandated by s 1 of the 1911 Act.

Willmer LJ held that there was no doubt that the Judge, in reaching his decision, considered both the blameworthiness and the causal significance of the faults committed by each of the vessels in relation to the stranding. Consequently, Hewson J was correct in finding that the George Livanos bore 50% of the blame. The appeal should be dismissed.

Winn LJ: Disagreeing with Hewson J, Winn LJ stated that s 1 of the 1911 Act necessitates that in a case like the present one, the liability of each ship involved should be assessed by comparing its fault with the fault of each of the other vessels individually and separately, without any conjunctive consideration. Therefore, since the collision was part of the cause of the grounding, the whole responsibility for both the consequence of the collision and the collision itself must be attributed to the respective vessels whose fault led to the collision and its ensuing consequence. The appeal should be upheld.

Danckwerts LJ: Section 1 of the 1911 Act necessitates the Court to assess the liability of one or more vessels in proportion to the degree of fault attributed to each vessel.  Hewson J's approach of treating the two colliding vessels as one unit produced manifestly unfair results. Proviso (a) to ss (1) is not applicable since it is possible to distinguish varying degrees of fault. Therefore, the apportionment of liability proposed by Winn LJ, where the George Livanos was found to be no more than 25% to blame, is considered the preferable approach. The appeal should be allowed.

[For the partially successful appeal to the House of Lords, see Miraflores (Owners) v George Livanos (Owners) [1967] 1 AC 826 (CMI2274).]