This matter arose out of admiralty claims involving an alleged breach of service contracts for the shipment of goods. The plaintiff was a common carrier by water for the transport of goods in interstate and foreign commerce. In 2019 and 2020, the plaintiff provided the defendant with shipping services to transport shipments of its used tyres from the United States to India. The plaintiff issued the defendant with 14 bills of lading for these shipments. According to the bills of lading, the departure dates ranged from May 2019-March 2020.

While the shipments were in transit, the defendant learned that the Government of India had placed restrictions on imported used tyres. As a result, the defendant instructed the plaintiff to change the final destination from India to Pakistan. Hapag-Lloyd confirmed this change. However, the shipments were allegedly not properly directed to Pakistan, but were delivered to ports in India. The containers were unloaded in India and held in storage. The defendant claims that it incurred storage charges and 'has been unable to satisfy the orders of its customers because the tires have not, and cannot clear customs in India'.

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, claiming breach of contract for failure to make payments for the shipping services that it had provided. The Court entered a default judgment in favour of the plaintiff for approximately USD 96,240. The defendant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. The defendant asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

Held: The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim is dismissed.

The plaintiff claims that the defendant's rights are governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC § 30701 (COGSA), which provides for a one-year statute of limitations and is the exclusive remedy for claims arising from the carriage of goods by sea. The plaintiff argues that the defendant's counterclaim is time-barred by COGSA, and by the contractual one-year limitation period in the bills of lading.

The defendant claims that there are issues of fact to be resolved before determining whether COGSA is the governing law in this case. The defendant asserts that COGSA's statute of limitations is only implicated when goods are lost or damaged and have reached their port of final destination. Because the goods were not lost or damaged and have not reached their port of final destination, the defendant argues that COGSA's statute of limitations does not apply. The one-year limitation period in the bills of lading does not apply because they only cover claims for lost or damaged goods.

COGSA regulates the carriage of goods by sea between US and foreign ports: Daewoo Int'l Corp v Sea-Land Orient Ltd 196 F 3d 481, 484 (3d Cir 1999). COGSA applies from ‘tackle to tackle', meaning 'the period of time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship': M3 Midstream LLC v S Jersey Port Corp 1 F Supp 3d 289, 294 (DNJ 2014); SPM Corp v M/V Ming Moon 965 F 2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir 1992) (CMI1849). When COGSA limits liability, it pre-empts state law, even if the claims are phrased as common law causes of action.

The plaintiff issued the defendant with 14 bills of lading. COGSA governs these bills of lading because they are contracts for carriage of goods from the United States to India: see Norfolk N Ry Co v Kirby 543 US 14, 29 (2004) (CMI1454). Because the dispute between the parties involves the shipment of goods by sea from the United States to foreign ports, COGSA applies to the shipments at issue that are the subject of the bills of lading.

The COGSA statute of limitations 'is one which extinguishes the cause of action itself, and not merely the remedy': Petroleos Mexicanos Refinacion v M/T King A 554 F 3d 99, 104 (3d Cir 2009) (CMI1800). COGSA provides for a one-year limitation period for suits to be brought against a carrier. To the extent that the defendant asserts that COGSA's statute of limitations never began to run because the goods were never delivered to their port of final destination, the argument is unpersuasive. First, the defendant concedes that the shipments were delivered to India and that all 14 bills of lading identify various ports in India as the port of final destination. Second, accepting the defendant's contention that Pakistan was the intended port of final destination, non-delivery does not foreclose the running of COGSA's statute of limitations. COGSA's one-year statute of limitations would accrue, at the latest, when notice was provided of effective delivery. Moreover, to the extent that the defendant contends that COGSA's limitations period applies only when goods are lost or damaged, this argument lacks merit. COGSA's one-year prescriptive period applies in suits for improper delivery of goods. Accordingly, the defendant's counterclaim is subject to COGSA's one-year statute of limitations.

However, the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to establish that the defendant's counterclaim is time-barred. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant filed its counterclaim on 8 June 2021, but does not attest to the date of delivery. Nowhere in its brief does the plaintiff identify the date of delivery of any of the shipments that arrived at the various ports in India. The plaintiff merely contends that 'all shipments were made prior to July 8, 2021, more than one year before Aleph filed the Counterclaim on July 8, 2021', but does not provide any bills of lading indicating when the shipments arrived at their ports of final destination. Without more information - specifically the date of delivery - the Court cannot assume that the defendant's counterclaim is time-barred.