The plaintiff was a passenger on the ferry M/V Stena Cambria owned by the defendant, Stena Sealink Ltd. The ferry was sailing between Holyhead, UK, and Dun Laoghaire, Ireland, when the plaintiff slipped on broken glass on the deck. The injured plaintiff disembarked later the same day. On 2 September 1993, the plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty.

The Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (the Athens Convention 1974) has the force of law in the UK pursuant to s 14 and Sch 3 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (UK), which was the statute in force at the relevant time, now replaced by s 183 and Sch 6 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK).

The defendants relied on the time-bar provisions of art 16 of the Athens Convention 1974 and applied to strike out the plaintiff's claim. This application was dismissed at first instance because on the proper construction of art 16, s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (UK) applied to this action for personal injury. The first instance Judge exercised the discretion provided by s 33 to disapply the time-bar.

However, the defendants' appeal was allowed and the action was struck out. The appeal Judge found that the words 'suspension and interruption' as contained in art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974 were inapplicable to s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (UK). The two-year time-bar applied.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the appeal Judge erred in holding that art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974 prohibited the plaintiff from commencing the action.

Part I of the Limitation Act 1980 (UK), headed 'Ordinary Time Limits for Different Classes of Action', provides in s 1, under the heading 'Time limits under Part I subject to extension or exclusion under Part II', as follows:

(1) This Part of this Act gives the ordinary time limits for bringing actions of the various classes mentioned in the following provisions of this Part.

(2) The ordinary time limits given in this Part of this Act are subject to extension or exclusion in accordance with the provisions of Part II of this Act.

Sections 11, 11A, and 12 in Part I lay down time limits for actions in respect of personal injuries, product liability and fatal accidents respectively.

Part II of the Limitation Act 1980 (UK) is headed 'Extension or Exclusion of Ordinary Time Limits'. Sections 28 and 28A deal with extension in cases of disability. Sections 29-31 deal with extension in cases of acknowledgement or part payment. Section 32 deals with postponement in the case of fraud, concealment or mistake. Section 33 (as amended), which is headed 'Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries or death', provides:

(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which - (a) the provisions of section 11 or 11A or 12 of this Act prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents; the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.

Section 39, under the heading 'Saving for other limitation enactments' provides:

This Act shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) or to any action or arbitration to which the Crown is a party and for which, if it were between subjects, a period of limitation would be prescribed by or under any such other enactment.

The parties agreed that, on the proper construction of art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974, the lex fori of the court seised of the case governs the grounds (if any) of suspension or interruption of limitation periods, subject of course to the three-year long-stop. The issues were:

(1) Does s 39 exclude altogether the application of the Limitation Act 1980 to the Athens Convention 1974?

(2) If the answer to (1) is in the negative:

(a) Does s 33 fall within the scope of art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974 as being a stipulation which governs the grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods, and

(b) If so, does s 33 on its proper construction apply to the Athens Convention 1974?

To succeed on this appeal, the plaintiff must not only successfully rebut the defendants' argument on s 39, but also obtain affirmative answers to both issues (2)(a) and (2)(b).

Held: Appeal dismissed.

The Athens Convention 1974 governs actions by passengers against vessels on which they are being carried at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim. Parties to the Convention have a wide variety of limitation laws. Francesco Berlingieri (ed), Time-Barred Actions (2nd edn, Lloyd's of London Press 1993) covers, among other things, provisions which might potentially fall within the scope of art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974. Some countries (eg Belgium) make no such provision, and, of those who do, the regimes differ widely.

The Court rejected the defendants' arguments on s 39. The defendants had argued that, since the Athens Convention 1974, as enshrined in the Merchant Shipping Act 1979, prescribes a period of limitation, the Limitation Act 1980 does not apply. But the Court must apply the opening words of art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974, which expressly incorporate the lex fori limitation rules in so far as they govern grounds of suspension and interruption. It is as if art 16.3 read 'The Limitation Act 1980 shall govern the grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods …'.

Section 39 cannot be interpreted as excluding from the ambit of the Limitation Act 1980 this stipulation in the Merchant Shipping Act 1979 which by its very terms incorporates the Limitation Act 1980 to the extent provided in art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974.

The whole of Pt II of the Limitation Act 1980 is potentially applicable to the Merchant Shipping Act 1979. This case, however, is concerned only with s 33. It is unnecessary to determine whether other sections in Pt II would qualify under art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974. Thus, the Court tentatively observed that while ss 28 to 32 might appear to qualify under Athens Convention 1974, art 16.3, the fact that in each case the section refers to periods of limitation 'prescribed by this Act', or words to that effect, may disqualify them.

In contrast, the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK) and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (UK) (COGSA) are excluded from the scope of the Limitation Act 1980 by virtue of s 39: Halsbury's Statutes, vol 24 (4th edn, Butterworths 1989) 695; Payabi v Armstel Shipping Corp [1992] QB 907. The Maritime Conventions Act 1911 governs, among others, actions for damages for loss of life or personal injuries by a person on a vessel against another vessel involved in a collision or other such incident. Section 8 of this Convention lays down a one-year time bar but contains a proviso (applied in The Alnwick [1965] P 357 (CA)) that art 16 of the Athens Convention 1974 did not have. Meanwhile, there is no provision in the Hague-Visby Rules, enacted by COGSA, comparable to art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974.

The Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments on s 33. While the Court accepted (as a general principle) the importance of giving a broad interpretation to international Conventions like the Athens Convention 1974 in accordance with the intention of its makers (James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] AC 141 (HL); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 (HL)), it does not follow that the intention of the makers was necessarily to relax the rules. The makers may just as likely have been to lay down, save in special cases, a strict and clear regime (as in Fothergill).

The plaintiff cited the dictionary definitions of the crucial words in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. For 'suspension', the plaintiff relied on 'the action of stopping or condition of being stopped … ; temporary cessation, intermission; … deferring, postponement'; and for 'interruption', 'temporary stoppage or cessation'. The plaintiff then sought to compare ss 32 and 33 and argued that the provision in the latter for exclusion of the time limit was precisely comparable to the provision for postponement under s 32 in the case of fraud, concealment or mistake. The plaintiff cited Sheldon v RHM Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd [1996] 1 AC 102 (HL) 146–147, which, the plaintiff suggested, equated exclusion with extension.

The Court distinguished Sheldon on its facts. The dictionary definitions went against the plaintiff's argument, since they all contemplated a break in a period or course of events which were presently in train. Section 33 made no such provision, but on the contrary empowered the Court to exclude altogether a period which had already run its course, and so could possibly be treated as a ground of suspension or interruption eligible under art 16.3 of the Athens Convention 1974. Even if it were eligible, s 33(1), which expressly refers to 'the provisions of section 11 or 11A or 12 of this Act', cannot be construed as embracing the Athens Convention 1974. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that this difficulty could be surmounted on the basis that the Court would substitute the Athens Convention 1974 for the sections specified. These very plain words are not susceptible of so drastic a revision.