The plaintiff, Ildefonso, filed a claim for EUR 18,076.75 against the defendant, Plana Motor SL, for breach of contract. The plaintiff was a Palestinian businessman engaged in the sale and import of motor vehicles into Palestine. The defendant was a commercial company of Spanish nationality whose corporate purpose was the sale of motor vehicles, both new and used, to individuals and companies.

The defendant, through its agent, Lorenzo, arranged a contract in terms of which the defendant sold to the plaintiff 15 used Fiat Punto passenger cars for a total price of EUR 79,500. The vehicles had to be transported by sea from Spain to the port of Ashdod in Israel, and had to have entry into Palestine before the end of 2018, given the existing import restrictions in Palestine. All of the terms of this agreement, both the aspects related to the sale and those related to the maritime transport of the passenger cars, were agreed verbally. In payment of the agreed price, the plaintiff made several bank transfers in favour of the defendant.

The 15 vehicles that were the object of the sale were transported under a 'port to port' bill of lading. The bill of lading noted the following: (i) Grimaldi Euromed SpA as freight forwarder and actual carrier; (ii) the defendant as shipper; (iii) the plaintiff as consignee; (iv) Valencia (Spain) as the port of loading; and (v) Ashdod (Israel) as the port of discharge. The 15 vehicles were actually loaded on 7 December 2018 on the Gran Bretagna in Valencia. The parties agreed that the defendant would pay the freight. The bill of lading was annotated 'freight prepaid'.

Once the vehicles were loaded, Lorenzo, with the knowledge and without the opposition of the defendant, assumed the effective direction of all the details related to the transport of the vehicles. In the exercise of this directive function, Lorenzo requested the freight forwarder to deliver the original bills of lading to him. Likewise, with the knowledge and without the opposition of the defendant, Lorenzo retained the bills of lading in his possession and did not deliver them to the plaintiff, in order for the latter to effectively receive the vehicles at their destination, until 21 May 2019. The vehicles were unloaded at the port of destination on 17 December 2018.

Held: Judgment for the plaintiff.

The main legal norm applicable in this trial to resolve the disputed elements concerning the international maritime transport of goods is the LNM (Law 14/2014 of 24 July 24 on Maritime Navigation), as well as the Hague-Visby Rules and SDR Protocol, since it is undisputed that the maritime transport here was formalised by means of a 'port to port' bill of lading. On the other hand, the Commercial Code (CCom) will be applicable to the commercial sale contract and the relationship that links Lorenzo with the defendant, which is a commission contract (or commercial mandate).

As a professional commission agent and ultimately as an entrepreneur, Lorenzo could not ignore the legal obligation contained in art 246.1 LNM, which is a peremptory norm, according to which the shipper is obliged to provide the consignee with bills of lading. Once Lorenzo received the bills of lading, he had to deliver them to the defendant in his capacity as shipper so that the latter in turn could send them to the plaintiff, and in this way the plaintiff could receive the goods at the port of destination.

The relevant contractual civil liability is attributable to the defendant. It is a proven fact that the latter, either directly or through Lorenzo, did not deliver the bills of lading to the plaintiff (or any agent of the latter), and without these documents, which transfer title of ownership of the goods carried, and are essential in order to be able to receive the goods, the plaintiff could not receive the transported vehicles at the port of destination. Article 3.3 of the Hague-Visby Rules and art 246.1 LNM establish the obligation of the carrier to deliver the bills of lading to the shipper. In the present case, the carrier delivered them to Lorenzo in the legitimate confidence that he acted as representative of the shipper, in this case the defendant. And, given that the carrier can only deliver the cargo carried to the legitimate holder of the original bills of lading (art. 252.1 LNM), the vehicles could not be delivered to the plaintiff.

Therefore, the 154-day delay of the vehicles in Ashdod constitutes a contractual breach that the plaintiff had no obligation to bear (arts 1101 and 1106 CCom). And between the behaviour of the defendant, by itself and through its representative, Lorenzo, and the economic damage actually suffered by the plaintiff, there is a causal link of unlawfulness that has been sufficiently proven.