This case involved carriage of a shipping container holding 20,010 kg of copper wire from China to the consignee, Centrans Marine Shipping (Centrans), in Newark, New Jersey. After US Customs cleared the container, an agent of CJ International Inc (CJ) signed a US Customs entry summary form, noting the shipment weight as 20,010 kg. The container was warehoused and under CJ’s control from 19 December 2018. On 27 December, Maverick Transport Inc (Maverick) was instructed by CJ to pick up the container and deliver it to Inter Metals Group (IMG) in Pennsylvania. On 3 January 2019, the container was removed from the port terminal under a ticket noting that the cargo weight was '17.81 MT'. Later that day, during the transfer of the container, an automatic equipment interchange receipt indicated that the cargo weight was zero. On 4 January, the shipping container was delivered to IMG and found to be empty. IMG submitted an insurance claim to Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency Inc (TCMA), which was denied.

IMG commenced an action on 18 June 2020, bringing claims under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 USC 101 ff, against Centrans, CJ, Maverick, and TMCA. IMG also brought state law claims against the defendants. Centrans moved to dismiss IMG's complaint, and renewed its motion to dismiss the cross-claims of APM, Maverick, and CJ.

Held: The motion to dismiss IMG's claims is granted in part and denied in part. The dismissal of IMG's state law claims is with prejudice, as those claims are pre-empted. Centrans’ motion to dismiss the cross-claims brought by Maverick and CJ is granted without prejudice.

The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 USC § 14706, governs the field of interstate shipping. Under the Carmack Amendment, a shipper can sue any carrier of the cargo, not just the original carrier. To establish a prima facie case against a carrier under the Carmack Amendment, a shipper must prove: (1) delivery of goods to the initial carrier in good condition; (2) damage of the goods before delivery to their final destination; and (3) the amount of the damages. IMG's claims are sufficient to bring a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment. As to the first prong, IMG has alleged delivery of the goods to the initial carrier in good condition, because IMG alleges that there was no change in the shipping container's cargo weight between departure and delivery to the initial carrier, Centrans. IMG further alleges that the shipping container was empty when it arrived at its final destination, and seeks damages of USD 110,000 for the value of the cargo, thereby satisfying the second and third prongs. The motion to dismiss IMG's Carmack Amendment claims is therefore denied.

IMG also brings various state law claims against the defendants, including negligence, unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage, conversion, common law fraud, and New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claims. These state law claims are pre-empted by both the Carmack Amendment, and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorisation Act, 49 USC § 14501(c) (the FAAAA). Circuit courts have consistently held that the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for interstate shipping claims alleging loss or damage to property. Further, the FAAAA expressly pre-empts state and common law claims against motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. For these reasons, IMG's state law claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Centrans contends that IMG's claims are governed by federal maritime law, and are time-barred. Centrans relies on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), which 'applies to a carrier engaged in the carriage of goods to or from any port in the United States': 46 USC § 30702(a). COGSA applies from 'tackle to tackle', meaning 'the period of time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship': 46 USC § 1301(e). Centrans also points to the Harter Act, 46 USC § 30701 ff, which governs the preloading and post-discharge periods until proper delivery is made to the consignee or its agent. Alternatively, carriers may extend COGSA to apply to the pre-loading and post-discharge periods through a paramount clause in the bill of lading: Royal & Sun All Ins PLC v Ocean World Lines Inc 612 F 3d 138, 142 n 6 (2d Cir 2010). Centrans argues that, as a forwarding agent, it is afforded the protections of COGSA and the Harter Act through the bill of lading's Himalaya clause, which extends those protections to the carrier's agents and subcontractors.

As to the timeliness of IMG's claims, Centrans argues that IMG's claims based on federal maritime law are barred by s 6(4)(G) of the bill of lading, which provides: 'The Carrier shall be discharged of all liability unless suit is brought in the proper forum and written notice thereof received by the Carrier within nine months after delivery of the Goods or the date when the Goods should have been delivered.' Centrans alternatively argues that IMG's claims are time-barred by COGSA's one-year statute of limitations, which applies to the post-discharge period through the bill of lading's paramount clause.

It is not apparent on the face of Centrans' complaint that IMG's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Whether the limitations period set forth in s 6(4)(G) of the bill of lading applies to Centrans cannot be ascertained at this stage. By Centrans’ own contention, the bill of lading's nine-month limitation period only extends to Centrans if, as the forwarding agent, it is covered by the Himalaya clause. The Himalaya clause is not contained within the complaint or the attached documents. Determining whether the Himalaya clause applies to Centrans would additionally require an examination of Centrans’ role in the shipment in relation to IMG and the carrier, which is a factual inquiry that cannot be resolved by considering only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record.

Further, whether COGSA's one-year limitation period applies is not apparent on the face of the complaint. IMG does not assert any claims under COGSA, and whether COGSA's statute of limitations applies to the post-discharge period through the paramount clause cannot be determined by reference to the complaint. Indeed, Centrans’ own briefing represents that whether COGSA or the Harter Act applies to the post-discharge period depends upon whether the two statutes are in conflict; again, an inquiry which cannot be answered at this stage.

Therefore, without deciding whether federal maritime law applies to IMG's claims against Centrans, dismissal of these claims on statute of limitations grounds is not warranted at this stage.