The plaintiff claimed for damage to a cargo of fruit carried in containers to Panama in house-to-house transport mode. The containers were delivered at the consignee’s premises between 21 and 26 March 2008. After reception, the consignee undertook inspections on all the containers, finalising these on 27 March 2008. The cargo arrived damaged. The consignee's claim was filed on 24 March 2009, and the plaintiff published a certificate of filing the lawsuit in a newspaper on 27 March 2009. [Publishing that certificate is one instrument established in the Panamanian Code of Maritime Procedure to interrupt the time-bar limitation if the lawsuit is not properly served before the expiration of that period.]

The defendant argued time-bar limitation under the applicable law, which for this case was the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 (COGSA 1936), which is based on the Hague Rules. According to art 3.6 of the Hague Rules/COGSA, the claimant has one year after delivery of the goods to file an action against the carrier for damages. The claimant opposed, alleging that the time-bar limitation starts only once the consignee has the opportunity to check the cargo in containers. The claimant relied on the theory of 'proper delivery', which states that the delivery is not only the discharge of the cargo from the vessel or the delivery in the agreed place, but the moment when the consignee has the opportunity to verify the cargo's condition. The Second Maritime Court in a decision issued 12 November 2012 accepted this theory, asserting that the due delivery took place, not when the containers were delivered at the consignee’s warehouses, but when the latter had performed inspection on the cargo, which took place by 27 March 2008. The defendants appealed this decision.

Held: The Civil Branch of the Supreme Court of Justice, acting as Court of Maritime Appeals, reversed the decision. The three justices stated that, according the applicable law, as well as under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier is not obliged to prove that it has performed a real and concrete delivery because its responsibilities end with the discharge of the goods from the vessel. In the case of house-to-house carriage, its responsibility ends with the delivery of the containers at the consignee’s premises and not when the consignee has the opportunity to inspect the cargo to find whether it is in good order. Hence the delivery of the containers took place on 21, 24 and 26 March 2008 and from those dates the time-bar limit of one year started running. Therefore, a publication of the certificate on 27 March 2009 fell outside that period of time, making it impossible for the claimant to continue its claim.