In a claim brought against Alfons Håkans Oy Ab (AH), Mr A stated that on 13 June 1989 he had been an engineer on board AH's ship M/S Neptun, when the ship's radio received a message that the Greek ship M/S Saronikos II had grounded on the shoal outside Kotka. On the same day, the Neptun set off towards the grounded ship, and arrived the next day at about 14h00, when the Neptun began rescue work. The rescue mission did not end until 30 June 1989. According to records, Mr A was employed from 14-30 June 1989 and recorded a total of 386.5 working hours on the operation.
Mr A considered that he had been on board AH's ship for the purposes of the Maritime Act when a ship which had been wrecked or was in danger was rescued. AH and A had not reached an agreement on the distribution of a salvage reward, and AH had failed to pay A. According to unofficial information, AH would have raised a total fee of FIM 7.2 million for the rescue mission.
Pursuant to s 209(2) of the Maritime Act, after deducting the items listed in the Act, the rest of the salvage fee must be paid to the master and crew in the proportion of one-third to the master and two-thirds to the crew in proportion to each crew member's salary. According to the same provision, if a dispute arises between salvors over the distribution of the salvage reward, the Court must determine it on the basis of the factors mentioned in s 206 of the Maritime Act.
Mr A claimed that AH was obligated to pay him a salvage allowance of FIM 162,951.63, plus interest.
AH denied the claim primarily on the ground that the Neptun was not on a voyage as required by s 209(2) of the Maritime Act, as a result of which the Saronikos II was not rescued and, secondarily, that Mr A's terms and conditions of employment included working for a company engaged in maritime rescue.
The Maritime Court found that AH had entered into an agreement with Neptun Maritime (Finland) Oy (NMF), which in turn had entered into a maritime rescue agreement to the effect that the Neptun would assist the Saronikos II off Kotka in the Gulf of Finland. NMF received GBP 254,843 from the shipowner of the Saronikos II, the Westminster Shipping Co Ltd. This salvage reward was based on LOF 80 terms.
On the facts, the Maritime Court found that the Saronikos II had been shipwrecked, and was in danger within the meaning of s 203 of the Maritime Act, as a result of which there had been a salvage situation under the Maritime Act. The Neptun had in fact been involved in rescuing the Saronikos II, as a result of which AH, the owner of the Neptun, acquired the right to receive salvage reward contributions. AH's business involved sea and port towing and sea rescue. AH was clearly the only professional salvor operating in Finland.
Developments in the maritime rescue sector have made it difficult to focus solely on maritime rescue. The 'no cure - no pay' principle of maritime salvage guarantees too precarious an income to equip expensive, well-equipped ships waiting in port for a rescue mission. Economic realities have forced maritime salvage companies to diversify. Company vessels need not be designed, equipped, or operated solely for rescue at sea.
According to maritime law, the Neptun is a vessel engaged in professional marine rescue, among other things, given that the vessel, as an integrated unit, belongs to AH's shipyard engaged in, among other things, professional rescue operations. In this capacity, AH has had the opportunity to equip the Neptun with the additional equipment and special expertise required for sea rescue.
According to long-standing and consistent Nordic practice, no explicit declaration of intent is required for waiver of a salvage reward portion, but it has been considered as a rule that a declaration of intent that is tacitly understood is sufficient. Legislative work in Finland in preparation for the Maritime Act has been carried out in co-operation with other Nordic countries on the basis of an international Convention, and this has led to uniform legislation in these countries. For this reason, and since a uniform Nordic interpretation is therefore the most appropriate for maritime reasons, the Maritime Court considered that it could rely on Nordic case law in this case.
In this case, the crew of the Neptun has been employed by a shipowner, AH, who clearly is involved in rescue operations, among other things. It must therefore not have come as a surprise to the crew of AH that the Neptun or any of the other vessels controlled by AH may have been involved in rescue operations. In those circumstances, when a crew member joins AH, he or she must be regarded as having waived his or her share of the salvage claim.
The phrase 'when a ship has rescued something on the voyage' in s 209(2) of the Maritime Act has been deemed to mean ships which deviate temporarily from their normal route in order to rescue something. The phrase has mainly been considered to refer to merchant ships. In the Nordic and domestic legal literature, the law has been interpreted broadly to mean that ships are on a voyage as soon as the ship is in service, albeit at berth, and rescue at sea involves a temporary departure from the ship's normal duties.
On this basis, the Maritime Court ruled that the concept of a 'ship en route' did not apply to the rescue at sea carried out by the Neptun, with the result that A's claim was unfounded and dismissed in its entirety. Mr A appealed to the Turku Court of Appeal, which effectively upheld the decision of the Maritime Court by a majority.
In the minority, Ahnger J noted that according to s 209(2) of the Maritime Act, the master and crew of a ship which has participated in rescue work are entitled to a portion of the salvage allowance 'when the ship has rescued something on the voyage'. It is not clear from the preamble to that provision, and the provisions of the 1939 Maritime Law or the Law of 17 February 1923 which preceded it, and the Salvage Convention 1910, when a ship is to be regarded as being on a voyage.
In interpreting the corresponding provisions of the Swedish and Norwegian Maritime Acts, it has been held in case law and legal literature that a ship has carried out rescue work while on a voyage even when the ship has been at berth in connection with the normal operation of the ship. There seems to be a prevailing perception in the Nordic legal literature that the concept of voyage must be interpreted as meaning that the master of a rescue ship and the rest of the crew may be entitled to a share of the rescue fee only if the rescue service constitutes an exception to the ship's normal operations. On this basis, it has been considered in the legal literature that a ship engaged in maritime rescue deviates from its normal duties while participating in the rescue work and the ship cannot therefore be considered as being on the voyage while carrying out the rescue work. This interpretation would appear to be based, among other things, on the idea that the economic viability of rescue shipowners and, at the same time, the rescue operation as a whole would be jeopardised if the salvage premium were to be shared with the crew. In particular, it should be borne in mind that the remuneration of the crews of rescue vessels in Norway and Sweden appears to be so favourable to the crew on the basis of a collective agreement that it may not be economically reasonable to grant them a share of the salvage premium.
The starting point for interpreting the law is to find out the intention of the legislator from the content of the law itself. When interpreting the content of s 209(2) of the Maritime Act, it must be assumed that the legislature did not intend to exclude lifeboat crews from the list of persons entitled to a rescue premium. There is no need to interpret s 209(2) as meaning that a ship whose normal activity includes salvage work and which, while at berth, sets out to carry out a specific rescue mission is not en route.
Mr A appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
The provisions of the Maritime Act of 9 June 1939/167 in force at the time of the incident shall apply.
On the grounds mentioned by the lower Courts, the Supreme Court considers that a maritime rescue situation referred to in s 203 of the Maritime Act applied, and that the Neptun participated in the rescue of the Saronikos II in a manner entitling it to receive a maritime salvage premium.
Section 209 of the Maritime Act contains provisions on how the rescue premium is to be distributed among those entitled to it. Section 209(5) provides: 'An agreement under which a lower proportion of the salvage premium that may be earned on a ship than that provided above shall be paid to the master or crew shall be void unless it is a ship engaged in rescue operations and specially equipped for that purpose'. On the grounds stated by the lower Courts, the Supreme Court considers AH to be a professional rescue company and that the Neptun is a rescue vessel within the meaning of s 209(5) of the Maritime Act.
It has not been expressly agreed between Mr A and AH that Mr A would not be entitled to a rescue premium. The Supreme Court considers that the waiver of the right to a salvage premium may, in accordance with the general principles of contract law, take place without an express agreement. The question is therefore whether, on taking up his employment with AH, Mr A waived his right to a share in the rescue premium.
In the Nordic countries, the case law in the field of maritime law has become very consistent. The provisions concerning maritime salvage and salvage premiums have essentially the same content in the various Nordic countries. According to Nordic case law, when a crew member is employed by an employer engaged in maritime rescue in addition to other maritime activities, he or she has waived his or her right to a maritime rescue allowance. This position is apparent eg from the judgment of the Norwegian Supreme Court of 24 October 1980 in ND 1980, p 190 (The Edda Salvator). The report does not provide any explanation of the contractual practice regarding the salvage premium in Finland which might give grounds to deviate from the uniform Nordic case law and to interpret the provisions of the Maritime Act concerning the rescue premium differently from other Nordic countries.
On the basis of the above, the Supreme Court considers that upon his employment with AH, a professional sea rescue professional, Mr A waived his right to receive a salvage reward.
[For related proceedings arising out of the same incident, and a Supreme Court judgment to identical effect, see KKO: 1995: 192.]