This case involved the consignment of a large quantity of animal feed from Durban (South Africa) to Brake (Germany). There was a voyage charter and a time charter. It was revealed that, when the animal feed was discharged in Brake, there was a large shortage. Krohn & Co Import/Export (the plaintiff), the consignee of the animal feed, commenced proceedings in South Africa against the time charterers. Writs were also issued in England and Wales. This action was commenced by a writ in personam issued in Hong Kong on 23 October 1980. The date is important because art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules states: 'Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall, in any event, be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery of the date when they should have been delivered.' This article did not alter the old position under art 3.6 of the Hague Rules, which provided that: 'In any event, the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within, one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.'

The goods were landed on 25 October 1979. The time bar expired at midnight on 26 October 1980. The writ in this action was therefore issued just in time. On 5 October 1981, the plaintiff purported to serve the defendant with a true copy of the writ of summons, that is the one that was issued on 23 October 1980, by sending the same to the defendant. The defendant contended that the plaintiff showed no sufficient or good reason to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion to extend the validity of the writ beyond the period of 12 months allowed for its service.

Held: Judgment for the defendant.

The defendant mentioned the time bar because after 25 October 1980, it was not open to the plaintiff to issue a fresh writ. Therefore, the extension of validity of the old writ touched directly upon a defence by the defendant, namely, the time bar prescribed in art 3.6 of the Hague Rules.

If it were open to the plaintiff to issue a new writ, that certainly would be a factor that would weigh with the Court in exercising its discretion. However, in this case, it was not open to the plaintiff to do that. Therefore, the Court had to weigh the plaintiff's hardship on one side against the deprivation of the defendant on the other side of its right to invoke art 3.6 of the Hague Rules.

In light of this case's facts and relevant domestic rules, the writ ought not to be extended.