The appellant maintains a fish farm in the Vassilikos area near Zygi. She has filed a lawsuit with the Cyprus Admiralty Court against the respondent for compensation for damages or losses suffered by her business. She claimed that these were caused by an oil spill in the marine area of ​​the Moni power station in 1997, while the defendant vessel, then owned by the respondent, discharged oil for the station's needs. At the same time, the appellant secured a prohibition order to prevent the sale or transfer of the ship.

The respondent filed an ad hoc request to the court for the cancellation of the arrest warrant for lack of jurisdiction. The respondent's argument was that the damage which, according to the appellant, was suffered by her fish farm does not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction provided by ss 1(1)(d) and 1(1)(f) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK) (AJA). This foreign law still governs the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court (art 29(1) of the Judges Law No 14/60, as amended). The Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), which replaced the AJA, contains explicit provisions [s 20(2)(e) and s 20(5)] conferring jurisdiction on the Court in relation to oil spill contamination. It should be noted that the law does not affect the jurisdiction of the Cyprus Admiralty Court as defined by the AJA. It does not apply in Cyprus. However, it was referred to by the Judge in the Court of First Instance in support of his reasoning and conclusions.

The appellant challenged the decision below on two grounds. First, the court's approach to the nature and origin of the damage (that is, that it was not damage 'caused by the ship') was basically erroneous. Second, the Supreme Court, as an admiralty court, applies the English law in force prior to independence, subject to any changes that may be made by the law of the Republic: arts 19(a), (b) and 29(2)(a) of N 14/60, as amended. This would include the provisions of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC 1969).

Held: Appeal rejected.

As to the first ground of appeal, the relevant authority is The Vera Cruz, which held that the dominant feature of establishing jurisdiction is that the damage must be done by the ship without, however, always having to physically come into contact with the subject. To exercise jurisdiction under this provision the ship must be the active instrument of the damage. The phrase 'done by a ship', as interpreted, means 'made by those in charge of a ship, with the ship as the noxious instrument'. The objective link between the ship's behavior and the damage that has occurred must be immediate. Here it is obvious that the damage, if proven, was not caused directly by the ship itself, but was a consequence of another cause. This ground of appeal cannot succeed.

As to the second ground of appeal, Cyprus has acceded to the CLC 1969, which was ratified by N 63/89 and is now part of Cyprus' internal law. Article 12 of N 63/89 defines the Supreme Court as the competent court 'in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Convention, to hear and determine damages in the Republic under the Convention...' The suggestion is that the combination of the provisions of arts 19 (a) and (b), 29(2)(a) and (b) of N 14/60 and art 12 of N 63/89, the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, exercised by the Supreme Court, was extended to cover cases of compensation for oil pollution.

We note that the jurisdiction of a tribunal and the cases that may be subject to it are paramount creatures of law. In addition to the powers conferred on it by the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction as an Admiralty Court (arts 19(a) and 29(2)(a) of N 14/60): The Ship Yayasan Satu v Welsen Shipping Co Ltd (1999) 1 AAA 1452. It also has the power to rule exclusively at first instance on 'such other matters as the Court may have the power to hear and decide at first instance by virtue of this or any other law in force at any given time' (art 19(b) of the same law). Art 12 of N 63/89 is such a law with judicial extensions. It is therefore up to the Supreme Court, as the only court, to hear cases on the CLC 1969. However, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court sitting as an admiralty court for two reasons. First, the cases subject to the admiralty jurisdiction are strictly delimited by the AJA. Second, the CLC 1969 itself does not specify or make any suggestion of involvement of an admiralty court.