This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Limaship Co Ltd (Limaship), against the decision of the District Court of Limassol on 31 December 1987 regarding a lawsuit against the defendant, E Mahlouzaridis, for recovery of the amount of compensation awarded to G Tziellas for injuries he suffered during his employment during the loading of the Nadalena H. Limaship was at the relevant time in charge of and responsible for loading the Nadalena H in the port of Limassol. Tziellas was Limaship's employee. On 28 December 1979, Tziellas was injured during his employment while loading the ship.

The Supreme Court as a Maritime Court adjudicated in favor of Tziellas and against Limaship in the amount of CYP15,380 as general and special compensation for the bodily injuries he suffered. It was found that the cause of the accident was the defective ladder which Tziellas was provided to carry out his work. According to the judgment of the Court, Limaship had not fulfilled its relevant duties as an employer and was held liable: see Tziellas v The Ship 'Nadalena H' (1982) 1 CLR 807 .

Limaship then filed a lawsuit in the Limassol District Court seeking recovery of the amount of the above compensation from the defendant, who, as its employee, performed the duties of caretaker of the loading of the ship at the essential time. In its statement of claim, it attributes the injury of Tziellas to the negligence of the defendant, and invokes breach of implied and/or express terms of his employment contract.

A preliminary legal point was heard as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of first instance ruled that the issue in question was a maritime dispute over which the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction as a Maritime Court under s 19(1) of the Law on Courts 1960 (Law 14/60) and dismissed the action. The subject of this appeal is the correctness of that decision. The answer to the question depends on the interpretation of s 1(1)(f) of the Administration of Justice Act of 1956 (UK) (the Act) applicable in Cyprus in accordance with s 29(2)(a) of the Law on Courts 1960 (Law 14/60).

Held: Appeal allowed.

The Court of first instance, applying by analogy what was decided in The Jade [1976] 1 All ER 920 and The Antonis P Lemos [1985] 1 All ER 695, accepted that the relevant provision of the Act should be interpreted broadly. The Act was enacted to apply the provisions of a relevant international Convention, the Arrest Convention 1952, and thus should be interpreted broadly and liberally.

Following the first instance decision, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to deal with the interpretation of some of the provisions of s 1(1) of the Act. The subject of the interpretation was not s 1(1)(f). However, the interpretive approach adopted also assists in relation to this provision. Avgerinos Master Shipping Co Ltd v Cyprus Insurance Co Ltd, Case No 44/89, 5 March 1990, and E Philippou Ltd v Compass Insurance Co Ltd, Case No 258/84, 31 December 1990, which were heard at first instance; and Biochemie ROSE Ltd v General Insurance of Cyprus Ltd, Civil Appeal No 7552, 31 October 1990 (CMI1060), examined whether disputes relating to a marine insurance contract are a maritime claim within the meaning of the Act. In Avgerinos, the Supreme Court as the Maritime Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear an action against an insurance company to cover the damage suffered by the plaintiffs' ship. It held that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the claim was not a 'claim for damage to a ship' in accordance with s 1(1)(e) of the Act.

In Biochemie, the plaintiff was covered by an insurance company for damage or loss of goods during their transport by ship. The Court of first instance held that the right of jurisdiction fell within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as a Maritime Court because it was a 'claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship' under s 1(1)(g), and a 'claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship', in accordance with s 1(1)(h). The Court of Appeal ruled that the claim was outside the scope of the above provisions and, therefore, was not a maritime claim. The same conclusion was reached in E Philippou Ltd.

In all three cases, the English case of Gatoil v Arkwright-Boston Insurance [1985] 1 All ER 129 was applied as directly relevant to the subject. In this case, the claim concerned the payment of insurance premiums under an insurance contract. The House of Lords Judiciary Committee ruled that the premium agreement was not of such a nature that it could be regarded as an agreement relating to the carriage of goods on any ship, whether chartered or otherwise, as there was no reasonably direct link between the agreement and the activities referred to in the Act. Four of the five judges (Lord Keith left the matter open) considered that the correctness of the above approach was also confirmed by the travaux préparatoires of the Arrest Convention 1952 for the purpose of which the Act was adopted into law. It appeared that the parties had specifically considered the matter and rejected the idea of including an article covering it in the Convention.

In the decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned, the claim did not concern the collection of insurance premiums. It covered the damage done to a ship or to goods on a ship or their loss. It was considered that the nature of the claim and the head of jurisdiction identifying it should be directly and not indirectly or remotely related to the carriage of the goods by a ship, and that the existence of a coherent link between the claim and carriage by a ship, or damage done to a ship, is a necessary condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Maritime Court. It was stressed in Biochemie that 'the carriage of goods by ship is a similar reason for the contract, of secondary importance, subject to the control of third parties, the carriers' and it was decided that the broader issue of insurance coverage did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Maritime Court.

The nature of the transferable right is also a decisive criterion in the present case. We do not agree that s 1(1)(f) should be approached on the basis that the question that should be answered is whether the claim could have come from a person other than the one who had suffered personal injury. The paramount requirement is 'for' physical damage. The preposition 'for' is clearly narrower in meaning than the expressions 'relating to' and 'arising out of'. Thus, the broad interpretation in The Jade and Antonis P Lemos, in relation to the above expressions in the text of other sub-paragraphs of s 1(1) of the Act, does not assist in the interpretation of s 1(1)(f), which is worded differently. In the above cases, the expression used by the legislator, in its natural and ordinary sense, was amenable to the expansive interpretation adopted, taking into account the general position as to the interpretation of laws aimed at the application of international Conventions to which the Court of first instance also referred. In the case of s 1(1)(f), the same margin does not exist. The source of the right to claim must be bodily harm. It is not possible for the provision of the Act 'any claim for ... personal injury' to mean a claim for something else. This would not be a choice of two or more meanings that the phrase in question may have in its ordinary and natural sense. It would be an addition to it that cannot be justified under any interpretative rule.

Limaship's claim is not based on the personal injury suffered by Tziellas. This was the basis of the lawsuit for damages brought by Tziela himself who was the person who was injured, and which was already decided by the Maritime Court. Limaship's claim is based on its alleged right to be compensated by the defendant on the terms of his employment. The fact that the negligence of Mahlouzaridis appears to be also an element that must be proven in order to establish his responsibility based on the terms of his employment, does not change the nature of the right to claim, which is different from the one referred to in s 1(1)(f). The observation in Biochemie regarding the fact that the transport of the goods itself was an issue similar to the maritime insurance contract on which the right to claim was based, is valid, with the necessary adjustment and as regards the personal injury suffered by Tziellas in relation to the enforceable right relied upon by Limaship to obtain recovery of the amount of compensation awarded against it. The argument that if, in the context of Tzielas' lawsuit, Mahlouzaridis has been called as a third party, he and Limaship's current claim would certainly have been examined by the Maritime Court, is based on hypothetical data.

For the above reasons, the issue in the present case, as defined in the statement of claim, is not a maritime issue under s 1(1)(f). Therefore, it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as a Maritime Court, but within the jurisdiction of the District Court.